Tunnels, Treasures, and Trainers: The Three Pillars of Iran's 2008 Support for Hamas

The year 2008 marked a critical juncture in the military-strategic relationship between Iran and Hamas, transitioning from support to a full-spectrum, operational partnership. This period, defined by Gaza's isolation and culminating in Operation Cast Lead, saw Iran become the primary patron of Hamas through a multi-faceted program of financial, military, and training assistance.

I. High-Level Political and Rhetorical Backing

During Gaza's isolation, Iran's most senior leaders—including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Speaker of the Parliament Ali Larijani, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—publicly pledged that Iran would not abandon the group. This high-level political cover was operationalized through direct collaboration between key Iranian and Hamas officials.

Key Personnel involved were:

Iranian Side: Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and Iranian Minister of Intelligence and Security Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejehei.

Hamas Side: Leader Khaled Meshaal, Political Bureau Deputy Musa Abu Marzuq, and the Hamas representative in Iran, Abu Usama Abd al-Mu’ti.

This coordination was formalized at a high-level meeting on May 24, 2008, where Khaled Meshaal met with Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Saeed Jalili, Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Ibrahim Ja’afari, Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, and Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi. The relationship was so close that, following news of talks between Syria and Israel in late May, Hamas was rumored to be considering moving its political headquarters from Damascus to Tehran.

II. Financial Support: A $150 Million Infusion

In late May 2008, reports indicated that Iran significantly increased its financial backing, allocating $150 million specifically for the second half of the year. This funding was channeled through the Iranian Bank Melli’s Damascus branch, creating a secure financial pipeline directed by Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal, who had resided in Syria since the group's exile from Jordan in 1999.

III. Weapons and Technology Transfer: Enhancing Lethality and Range

The financial support was directly complemented by a sophisticated and diverse flow of advanced weaponry, designed to penetrate Israeli armor and threaten population centers deeper inside Israel.

Advanced Anti-Armor Weapons: Hamas received shipments of Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs), known as the “Shawaz.” These were similar to those used against U.S. forces in Iraq and could penetrate up to 200 mm of steel. With Iranian assistance, Hamas modified the EFP to create a “Shawaz 4” model for enhanced performance against Israeli tanks and armored personnel carriers.

Rocket Arsenal Expansion and Innovation: A major focus was on improving Hamas's rocket capabilities. Iran reportedly dedicated a special production line to ‘collapsible’ Grad rockets with a 16km range. These new rockets consisted of four 50cm sections, making them far easier to disassemble and smuggle. The origins of the rockets were diverse: some may have been produced in China and distributed by Iran, while others were manufactured at the “Martyr Bakiri” complex in Tehran. During Operation Cast Lead, as of January 14, Hamas fired a significant number of these rockets, including 94 Chinese Grad rockets with 40 km ranges, 71 122mm rockets with 20 km ranges, 4 175 mm rockets, and 48 90 and 155mm rockets. Iran also actively worked to increase the striking distance of Hamas's rockets and replenished stockpiles, such as Katyusha rockets, after the early March 2008 conflict, often smuggling them in by sea. Other shipments also included 120mm mortars.

IV. The Elaborate Smuggling Network

To deliver this advanced weaponry into the blockaded Gaza Strip, a complex and multi-faceted smuggling network was employed, which was heavily boosted by a breach in the Gaza-Egypt border wall that occurred in January 2008. The primary method involved the extensive use of tunnels running under the Egypt-Gaza border. Arms would be broken down into their component pieces and moved piece-by-piece through this underground network. Alongside the tunnels, several ingenious maritime methods were used. Smugglers would often stow weapons on humanitarian aid ships as cover.

Another method involved dropping weapons overboard from ships anchored in Egyptian waters in buoyed, waterproof containers; these would then float into Gazan waters to be retrieved by Palestinian fishermen. In a more daring tactic, Iranian frogmen were used to tow waterproof containers from Iranian ships directly to Palestinian fishing boats underwater. Finally, on land, arms dealers or Sinai Bedouins would transport weapons to Gaza’s border, completing a land route that could, in some cases, extend as far south as Somalia.

V. Military Training: Building a Professional Force

Iran provided extensive training to Hamas operatives in 2008, a program distinguished by its significant scale, sophistication, and direct involvement. The sheer number of trainees was substantial, with multiple reports confirming that "hundreds" of Hamas operatives received instruction in Iran during that year. This is supported by specific figures, including 200 operatives who returned through the breached border wall in January 2008, and a Hamas commander's claim that 150 fighters had completed training with an additional 150 in training as of early March. Further evidence of this scale is seen in the delay of seventy operatives at the Rafah crossing in mid-July and the assertion by Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin that Hamas was transferring "tens" of individuals to Iran in early March, with promises of hundreds more. Syria also served as a critical training hub, with sixty-two operatives allegedly training there as of March 9, 2008, adding to another 650 who had trained there previously under instructors who were themselves graduates of Iranian training.

To maximize its reach and maintain security, Iran employed a "train-the-trainer" model, where operatives trained in Iran would return to Gaza to instruct others, creating a powerful multiplier effect. This was supplemented by emailed training materials. Israeli Defense Forces Southern Commander Yo’av Gallant highlighted the effectiveness of this system, noting that if ten trained men each trained ten more, the impact would be massive. By the start of Operation Cast Lead, hundreds of such trainers were active in Gaza, with at least 100 Iran-trained operatives reported as ready for combat. The curriculum for these operatives was comprehensive, covering advanced tactics, weapon operation, sniper skills, the ability to make explosives from everyday objects, and Hezbollah-style tunnel warfare. To avoid interdiction, trainees followed a circuitous travel route from Gaza to Egypt, then to Damascus, and finally from Syria to Iran. In a highly provocative escalation of direct involvement, seven to ten members of the Iranian Qods Force themselves allegedly entered Gaza in July 2008 using forged Iraqi passports to provide hands-on weapons training and conduct inspections of border areas.

VI. Operational Impact and Acknowledgment

The comprehensive nature of this support had a direct and significant impact. U.S. and Israeli officials concluded that without Iranian financing, weapons, and training, Hamas could not have inflicted as many Israeli casualties as it did.

The value of this partnership was publicly acknowledged by Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal when he visited Tehran on February 2, 2009, following Operation Cast Lead. He explicitly thanked Iran for its help, declaring the country a “partner in victory.” This statement served as a public affirmation of an allied relationship that was decisively forged and proven in the crucible of the 2008 conflict.

• This article is written by Abu Dhar al-Bosni (lokiloptr154668 on X) and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the website), nor does it necessarily represent an agreement with these perspectives.