America First, Middle East Last: U.S. National Security Policy and Withdrawal from the Middle East

A Philosophical Reorientation

The recently released 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) stands as one of the most illuminating official policy documents published in recent years. It offers rare and candid insight into the evolving architecture of U.S. foreign policy amid global realignment, with particular attention to some of its most sensitive recalibrations—most notably, America’s shifting posture in the Middle East. It explicitly rejects the post-Cold War project of liberal internationalism and global democratic promotion, framing it as a costly error that undermined American sovereignty, industry, and middle-class prosperity. In its place, the document articulates a hard-nosed "America First" realism, defined by a relentless focus on "core national interests," economic security as the foundation of national power, and a decisive disengagement from long-term military and nation-building entanglements.

This strategy marks a clear departure from the framing of major power competition as the central organizing principle of foreign policy, a hallmark of both the previous Trump and Biden administrations. Instead, it presents a world where the "primacy of nations" is paramount and where U.S. foreign policy will be "pragmatic without being 'pragmatist,'" focused on outcomes that directly benefit American prosperity and safety. The overarching goals are to rebuild American industrial and military strength at home, insist on "burden-sharing" from wealthy allies, and prevent any single adversary from achieving regional or global domination.

The Western Hemisphere: The "Trump Corollary"

Declaring "the days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over," the strategy announces a "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. The Hemisphere is now the top priority, with goals focused on controlling migration, combating drug cartels (potentially with military force), and aggressively rolling back foreign (primarily Chinese) influence over ports, infrastructure, and strategic assets. U.S. embassies are directed to act as commercial advocates for American companies. Importantly, the United States’ sudden contemplation of intervention in Venezuela can be understood through this lens: the Monroe Doctrine is being reasserted as a central organizing principle of U.S. hemispheric policy.

Asia: Economic Competition with Guardrails

The document acknowledges the Indo-Pacific as the world's key economic battleground and frames China as a rival whose economic practices—from intellectual property theft to fentanyl precursors—must be countered. However, it adopts a conciliatory tone, speaking of "rebalancing" the trade relationship rather than outright confrontation. It commits to deterring conflict, particularly over Taiwan, by building military capacity within the "First Island Chain" and pressing regional allies like Japan and South Korea to vastly increase their own defense spending and host U.S. forces.

Europe: A Civilizational Critique

The strategy delivers a stark, ideological critique of Europe, warning of "civilizational erasure" due to migration policies, shrinking birthrates, and "regulatory suffocation." It seeks to "help Europe correct its current trajectory" by encouraging sovereign, nationalist political movements and demanding Europe take primary responsibility for its own defense. On Russia, it omits blame for the Ukraine war and calls for an "expeditious cessation of hostilities" to reestablish "strategic stability," positioning itself against European governments it accuses of suppressing popular will for peace.

The Middle East - A Calculated Departure

The most significant and concrete shift in U.S. grand strategy is its deliberate de-prioritization of the Middle East. For half a century at least, the document notes, American foreign policy prioritized the Middle East above all other regions based on three imperatives: the region's status as the world's dominant energy supplier, its role as a primary theater of superpower competition, and persistent conflicts threatening global spillover and direct attacks on the American homeland. Importantly, in my view, the document’s assertion that U.S. foreign policy has been disproportionately focused on the Middle East for at least “half a century” is best understood as a reference to the Iranian Revolution and the subsequent rise of political Islam. From Washington’s perspective, this transformation marked the emergence of a sustained ideological and security challenge to U.S. interests, regional order, and allied stability—an assessment to which the document repeatedly alludes, both explicitly and implicitly, throughout its broader strategic framework.

The strategy argues that "at least two of those dynamics no longer hold." Global energy supplies have diversified significantly, with the United States restored as a net energy exporter—a transformation accelerated by the administration's rescission of restrictive energy policies and domestic production ramp-up. Meanwhile, "superpower competition has given way to great power jockeying," in which the U.S. retains the "most enviable position," reinforced by President Trump's "successful revitalization of our alliances in the Gulf, with other Arab partners, and with Israel."

As the strategy bluntly states: "The days in which the Middle East dominated American foreign policy in both long-term planning and day-to-day execution are thankfully over—not because the Middle East no longer matters, but because it is no longer the constant irritant, and potential source of imminent catastrophe, that it once was."

Current Security Landscape

Contrary to media narratives, the document argues "there is today less to this problem than headlines might lead one to believe" and provides specific examples of resolved or stabilizing conflicts:

Iran: Explicitly identified as the "region's chief destabilizing force," but "greatly weakened" by two developments: Israeli military actions since October 7, 2023, and President Trump's June 2025 "Operation Midnight Hammer," which "significantly degraded Iran's nuclear program."

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Acknowledged as "thorny," but progress achieved through Trump's negotiated ceasefire and complete "hostage" release. The strategy argues that "Hamas's chief backers have been weakened or stepped away."

Syria: Characterized as "a potential problem," but stabilization possible through coordinated American, Arab, Israeli, and Turkish support, enabling it to "reassure its rightful place as an integral, "positive" player in the region." This point is critical because it indirectly signals a strategy of effectively “dividing the cake” of Syria among key American regional partners—Israel, Turkey, and Arab states—according to converging and mutually negotiated interests. This interpretation runs directly counter to the claims of many superficial analysts who predict an inevitable or imminent clash between Israel and Turkey, overlooking the deeper logic of interest-based coordination that underpins the strategy outlined in the document.

The Three Pillars of the New Middle East Policy

Burden-Shifting to Regional Partners

The U.S. explicitly states it will no longer engage in "decades of fruitless 'nation-building' wars." Instead, it expects key partners (client states) to assume lead roles: Israel in militarily countering Iran and its allies, and the wealthy Arab Gulf states in financing the reconstruction of Gaza and Syria. Security is to be managed through local actors with U.S. support, not U.S. leadership.

Additionally, in a stark reversal, the strategy declares an end to the "misguided experiment with hectoring" allies like the Gulf monarchies on governance and human rights. Reform will only be "encouraged" where it emerges "organically," with the U.S. accepting the region "as they are while working together on areas of common interest." This removes a perennial point of friction—and conditionality—from bilateral relations. As the document states: "The key to successful relations with the Middle East is accepting the region, its leaders, and its nations as they are while working together on areas of common interest."

America's Core Interests

Despite the spin, the strategy lists five non-negotiable core interests that will continue to shape minimal essential engagement:

1. Preventing Gulf energy supplies from falling to "an outright enemy [Iran and its allies]"

2. Maintaining open and navigable Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea

3. Preventing the region from becoming an "incubator or exporter of terror" against U.S. interests or homeland

4. Ensuring Israel remains secure

5. Expanding the Abraham Accords to more regional nations and Muslim countries

Expert Skepticism and Strategic Risks

However, some analysts question the feasibility of this clean pivot. The Soufan Center and Brookings scholars highlight several critical vulnerabilities:

• The assumption that conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen are nearly resolved is "optimistic." A restart of the Gaza war could re-ignite regional violence and Red Sea shipping attacks. The underlying Israeli-Palestinian conflict is dismissed as merely "thorny," despite it being a central obstacle to broader normalization, particularly with Saudi Arabia.

• The strategy downplays Iran's ability to reconstitute its nuclear program and regional influence. The fate of its stockpile of highly enriched uranium is unknown, and Iran retains the technical knowledge to rebuild.

• Every president since Obama has attempted to shift focus away from the Middle East, only to be drawn back in by crises. The region's intrinsic volatility and the high stakes of energy and maritime security make sustained disengagement historically difficult.

• The Israeli lobby remains a powerful force in Washington and has historically limited the ability of U.S. presidents to pursue Middle East policy independently. Across administrations, it has consistently exerted political, institutional, and electoral pressure to ensure continued American strategic, diplomatic, and military involvement in the region. As a result, regardless of stated strategic pivots or rhetorical commitments to de-prioritization, every U.S. administration faces strong internal incentives to sustain a significant Middle East presence.

Conclusion: A Strategy of Sovereign Realism

The 2025 NSS is a coherent manifesto for a more insular, self-interested, and economically focused America. It repudiates the role of global guardian of a liberal order, viewing alliances and international institutions as tools to be managed strictly for advantage. Its success hinges on two precarious bets: that America's rivals will not aggressively fill the voids it leaves, and that complex global threats can be neatly compartmentalized and delegated.

Nowhere is this gamble clearer than in the Middle East. The strategy is a high-stakes wager that past investments in regional alliances and military overmatch have created sufficient stability for the U.S. to step back without triggering a catastrophic collapse or ceding ground to adversaries. Whether this constitutes a prudent adjustment to new global realities or a dangerous abdication that invites greater conflict will be the defining test of this new American strategy.