The Strategic Schism: Sectarianism Versus Anti-Imperialism in Modern Jihadist Movements

(This article is written by a friend of mine from Bosnia and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the Website), nor does it represent his agreement with these perspectives.)

The 1974 attack on Egypt’s Military Technical College by Salih Sirriya—an early Salafi-Jihadist figure later venerated by al-Qaeda—reveals a foundational ideological rupture. As documented by The New York Times (April 22, 1974), Sirriya, a Palestinian carrying both Iraqi and Libyan passports upon his arrest, had been expelled from mainstream Palestinian resistance groups for extremist fanaticism prior to his operation. Egyptian authorities explicitly denied any organizational link between Sirriya’s plot and Palestinian factions, framing him as an isolated radical. This episode crystallizes a recurring pattern: Salafi-Jihadism’s theological rigidity often precludes pragmatic alliances, rendering its operations strategically quixotic.

This divergence sharpens when contrasted with Khomeinist thought. Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander Sardar Safavi’s reflection on training with the secular Fatah movement in Lebanon—"I disliked their anti-religious stance, but understood our fight was against a common enemy"—highlights a critical distinction. Where Khomeinists prioritize anti-imperialist unity across sectarian lines, Salafi-Jihadists frequently elevate puritanism above strategic necessity. The 1997 exodus of Bin Laden’s fighters to the Taliban, preferring to slaughter Hazara Shias rather than confront the U.S. superpower (per Ali Soufan’s The Black Banners), exemplifies this tactical disconnect.

Why then do Shia movements generally demonstrate more consistent anti-imperialism? Structural realities provide clarity. Shia communities—as minorities facing U.S.-aligned Sunni autocracies in Iraq, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia—recognized that simultaneously fighting Sunni regimes and Western powers was suicidal. Khomeini’s Pan-Islamic vision thus emerged from necessity: only cross-sect solidarity could expel imperialism. Lebanon’s exception proves the rule; figures like Fadlallah, Musawi, and Nasrallah succeeded by framing Maronites as imperialist proxies while building multi-confessional resistance.

Conversely, (post-2000s) Salafi-Jihadists often exploit Sunni-majority demographics for opportunistic sectarianism. Zarqawi’s Iraq strategy epitomized this calculus. Recognizing that de-Baathified Sunnis would more readily kill vulnerable Shias than battle American occupiers, he ignited civil war through accelerationist violence. His aim was coldly demographic: provoke sectarian bloodshed to consolidate Sunni power across the Northern Iraq, where Sunnis form the majority of the population. Western analysts misunderstood this, projecting romantic anti-imperialist frameworks onto a leader whose conqueror logic mirrored Tamerlane’s—deliberately spilling "rivers of blood" to bait enemies into overreaction.

Exceptions like Hamas (maintaining secular alliances against Israel) or the Taliban 2.0 (pragmatically engaging Iran and China) confirm that ideology bends to material conditions. The core schism endures: minority vulnerability forces coalition-building anti-imperialism, while majority privilege enables sectarian expediency. Khomeinists treated blood as currency for liberation; Zarqawi weaponized it as cement for sectarian dominion—a chasm defining jihadism’s divergent paths.