The "Proto-Abraham Accords" of 1978-1982: A Failed Anti-Syrian Coalition

Introduction: The Anglo-Zionist Strategy of Reactionary Alliances

In its persistent effort to secure a colonial foothold for itself and its Zionist proxy in the Middle East, the United States has repeatedly attempted to forge alliances between regional reactionary states. The objective is to create a unified front against revolutionary, anti-imperialist movements. The first major attempt was the 1955 Baghdad Pact, which established the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)—a Middle Eastern analogue to NATO—comprising the pro-Western regimes of Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, with the cooperation of Jordan and Iraq. This pact aimed to contain the revolutionary pan-Arabism led by Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt. Its failure was sealed by the 1958 Iraqi Revolution and definitively buried by the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

The most recent iteration of this strategy is the 2020 "Abraham Accords," a normalization agreement between the Zionist entity, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Morocco, and Bahrain. Proponents acknowledge this project remains incomplete without Saudi Arabia's participation, and it has suffered a severe blow from the Palestinian Resistance's actions on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent Zionist genocide in Gaza.

Between these two well-known attempts lies a forgotten initiative: a silent, anti-Syrian coalition active between 1978 and 1982. If CENTO targeted Nasserist Egypt and the Abraham Accords target Khomeinist Iran, this proto-alliance was squarely aimed at containing Hafez al-Assad's revolutionary Syria.

The "Unholy Alliance": Members and Objectives

This unofficial pact brought together a constellation of actors whose primary common interest was the destabilization of Syria:

• "Israel" under Menachem Begin

• Egypt under Anwar Sadat

• Jordan under King Hussein

• Iraq under Saddam Hussein

• The Lebanese Phalangists

  
  

The alliance pursued three central objectives:

1. To Bury the Palestinian Question: Sadat's strategy at Camp David explicitly excluded the Palestinian issue, aiming instead to create a fragmented West Bank governed by collaborationist "Village Leagues."

2. To Contain Syria in Lebanon: The members coordinated covert support for the Lebanese Phalange, using it as a proxy to check Syrian influence and power in Lebanon.

3. To Destabilize Syria Internally: These governments provided support for the Muslim Brotherhood's uprising against the government of Hafez al-Assad, seeking to undermine the state from within.

   
   

Syria in the late 1970s represented the most potent and active anti-Zionist force in the region. It not only refused normalization without the return of the Golan Heights but also hosted the "Rejectionist Front" of Palestinian factions that conducted operations independently of Yasser Arafat. Furthermore, as the host of two Soviet military bases, Syria was perceived as a direct geopolitical threat to American hegemony.

The Cracks in the Foundation: Why the Coalition Failed

The alliance was inherently fragile and ultimately collapsed due to three primary factors:

1. Divergent and Contradictory Interests: The member states shared a common enemy in Syria but were otherwise riven by mutual distrust and conflicting agendas. Saddam Hussein was enraged by Israel's 1981 bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor and, in retaliation, ordered Abu Nidal's group to assassinate an Israeli diplomat, hoping to provoke a conflict between his two enemies. Furthermore, the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981 brought Hosni Mubarak to power in Egypt. Unlike Sadat, who held a personal animosity toward Hafez al-Assad, Mubarak was willing to de-escalate, leading to a thaw in Syrian-Egyptian relations.

2. The Game-Changing Iranian Revolution: The 1979 Revolution provided Syria with a powerful, unexpected ally: Khomeinist Iran. This strategic partnership bolstered Hafez al-Assad, who successfully crushed the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in 1982. The Iranian Revolution also unleashed a colossal wave of pan-Islamist anti-Zionism, leading to the formation of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. These movements became persistent thorns in the side of Anglo-Zionist strategic designs.

3. Zionist Strategic Hubris: The government of Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon, intoxicated by Egypt's capitulation at Camp David, committed a fatal strategic error. In 1982, it invaded Lebanon not merely to push the PLO beyond the Litani River but to conquer Beirut and install a puppet government. The ensuing Sabra and Shatila massacres ignited universal outrage across the Muslim world, galvanized a new generation of anti-Zionist fighters, and severely set back the normalization process for decades.

   
   

Conclusion: A Recurring Pattern of Failure

The failure of the 1978-1982 coalition illustrates a persistent flaw in the strategy of imposing reactionary alliances upon the Middle East. Such pacts are inherently unstable because they are built on a negative consensus (opposition to a common enemy) rather than shared positive interests. The internal contradictions among the members and the enduring power of revolutionary resistance inevitably cause them to unravel.

A parallel dynamic is visible today. The unprecedented brutality of the Zionist genocide in Gaza and the entity's strikes against allied states have made even ostensibly pro-normalization leaders like Mohammed bin Salman and certain faction heads reluctant to formalize ties, fearing the wrath of their own populations—a cautionary tale reminiscent of Sadat's fate. It is often observed that Arab governments might have long ago normalized relations with the Zionist entity, if not for its ghoulish propensity for the mass murder of Arab children. The failure of the proto-Abraham Accords serves as a historical precedent, demonstrating that no amount of top-down diplomacy can secure lasting peace without justice for Palestine.

• This article is written by Abu Dhar al-Bosni (lokiloptr154668 on X) and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the website), nor does it necessarily represent an agreement with these perspectives.