The Martyr, The Mole, and The Militia: Unpacking the Mystery of Beit Jinn

Introduction: A fighter's Identity and a Militia's Many Names

The Syrian conflict has consistently defied easy categorization, giving rise to armed groups whose loyalties are as fluid as the battlefield itself. The story of the faction(s) originating from the Beit Jinn enclave—known at various times as the Omar Bin Al-Khattab Brigade, the Hermon Regiment, and potentially linked to the Syrian Jama'a Islamiyah—epitomizes this complexity. To ask whether these are the "same people" is to confront the central dilemma of the war: identity and allegiance are not fixed but are strategic assets to be wielded, shed, and reassumed for survival. The case of the "Martyr of Beit Jinn," and the subsequent controversy surrounding his legacy, cannot be understood without first unraveling the intricate and often contradictory history of the militia with which he was associated. When Elizabeth Tsurkov alleged this "martyr" was a Zionist collaborator, she injected her memory into a pre-existing web of ambiguous loyalties. Was he a pro-Jolani, a Baathist turncoat, or something else entirely? To answer this, we must first dissect the intricate and contradictory history of the militia he supposedly belonged to: the Beit Jinn Brigade.

Phase I: The Rebel Fighter - The Omar Bin Al-Khattab Brigade (2013-2017)

The group's origin lies in the armed opposition to the Assad regime. Formed on June 21, 2013, in Western Ghouta under the banner of Liwa al-Haq, it quickly evolved into the independent Omar Bin Al-Khattab Brigade. Centered around the town of Beit Jinn in the Quneitra Governorate, it integrated into the Southern Front of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). The brigade coordinated with other western Daraa-Quneitra factions and joined the Syrian Revolutionaries Front, engaging in battles against regime forces, most notably the Battle of Bishr al-Sabireen.

Its fighter base was locally drawn from the Beit Jinn enclave and adjacent Mount Hermon areas, fitting the profile of a "moderate" opposition group. However, even during this phase, a critical and complicating factor emerged: covert Israeli support.

The Israeli Connection: A Covert Foundation

The Omar Bin Al-Khattab Brigade was publicly identified as one of several Syrian rebel factions receiving support from Israel, a list that included Fursan al-Joulan, Firqat Ahrar Nawa, the Syrian Revolutionaries Front, and others. According to a 2018 Foreign Policy report cited by Tsurkov, this support began in 2013 and included "light arms, ammunition, mortar launchers, and transport vehicles," delivered via the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. Fighters received monthly stipends of approximately $75.

The brigade's leader, Iyad Kamal ("Moro"), cultivated a very close relationship with Israeli authorities. Senior Syrian opposition sources close to him claimed he held periodic meetings with Israeli officers in the Golan Heights and possessed an Israeli +972 phone number. His brother, Imad Kamal, was reportedly responsible for organizing these contacts until his death in a February 2017 artillery strike.

Phase II: Assad's Auxiliary - The Hermon Regiment (2017-2022)

Following major Syrian Arab Army (SAA) advances in 2017, the group faced overwhelming pressure and entered a "reconciliation agreement." It was formally dissolved and reborn as the Hermon Regiment, a militia battalion affiliated with the Ba'athist military intelligence. In a testament to the regime's pragmatic (or cynical) co-option strategy, Moro was retained as its commander.

However, this transition was fraught with ambiguity. In late January 2018, Moro publicly denied any involvement in the reconciliation, a clear attempt to manage his reputation. Furthermore, in a July 2020 interview with Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, a former leader of the Hermon Regiment known as 'Khattab' claimed that Moro's role had become largely "symbolic," as he no longer controlled the group's arms and primarily distributed salaries. Discrepancies also emerged regarding the group's size, with estimates ranging from 250 members (from a former Muslim Brotherhood affiliate in Beit Jinn) to 900 (from a former Jabal al-Sheikh commander).

Crucially, this reconciliation did not necessarily sever the Israeli connection. A military source told Al Modon that Moro's survival was secured after an "Israeli insistence on his survival as a local force that ensures the protection of the borders."

Phase III: Assassination, Fracture, and Reactivation (2022-Present)

The precarious balance Moro maintained shattered on January 13, 2022, when he was assassinated in Beit Jinn. His death triggered violent clashes between his loyalists and the Othman family, which was affiliated with the regime's Fourth Division, resulting in several deaths and injuries, including four children hit by stray bullets.

Then, in a May 2025 report, Al-Akhbar claimed Israel was attempting to "revive" the group based on the legacy left by Moro. The report alleged that Moro had maintained communication with officers of the Israeli Golani Brigade even after the reconciliation, facilitating Israeli patrols and aid convoys to Druze and Christian villages. The faction only objected once, "when it demanded a share of aid to be sent to Beit Jinn." This suggests that the group's collaborationist activities continued under the regime's nose, potentially making Moro a target for assassination by the very regime he had nominally joined.

Synthesis

This convoluted history is not a series of isolated events but a coherent, if cynical, narrative of survival in a fragmented battlefield.

1.  The Core of Tribal and Local Pragmatism: The ultimate loyalty for many of these fighters is not to a national cause but to their own tribe, village, and clan. Their shifting allegiances—from FSA to SAA, from Israeli ally to regime auxiliary—are transactional. They take money and arms from whoever provides them, be it the FSA, Israel, Iran, or the Assad regime. This explains the presence of seemingly ideological contradictions, such as a Muslim Brotherhood faction existing within a brigade that also collaborated with Israel.

2.  Israel's Omni-directional Border Strategy: Israel's primary goal is border security, not ideological consistency. It has established contracts with both pro-rebel and pro-Bashar groups, including elements of the Russian-trained "Fifth Corps" of the SAA. The case of Ahmad al-Awda's former rebels within the Fifth Corps—who carried Israeli M16s and later betrayed the SAA—is a parallel example of this strategy. When Ismail al-Najjar stated, "Hezb now pays Jolani's ppl to pass us arms," he was describing this very ecosystem of fluid, interest-driven alliances.

3.  The Plausible Fates of the "Martyr" of Beit Jinn: Given this context, the identity of the "Martyr of Beit Jinn," al-Saadi, becomes a profound mystery. If he was indeed from this brigade, several scenarios are possible:

• He could have been a genuine revolutionary idealist, doomed by his association with a compromised, collaborationist command structure.

• He might have been part of the faction that opposed the collaboration, leading to an internal conflict that cost him his life.

• He could have been a willing participant in the collaboration, making Tsurkov's accusation technically accurate, if politically slanderous to his memory as a martyr.

Conclusion: The Chameleon's Legacy

The journey of the Beit Jinn militia—from FSA to SAA, from Israeli proxy to regime auxiliary, and back towards reactivation—is a definitive case study of the Syrian conflict. It demonstrates that the labels "revolutionary," "regime loyalist," and "collaborator" are not fixed identities but temporary roles adopted for survival and local advantage. The story of the fighter of Beit Jinn is inextricably woven into this chameleon-like existence. To understand his fate is to acknowledge that in the Syrian borderlands, the lines between hero and villain, patriot and traitor, are not just blurred—they are constantly being redrawn by the ruthless logic of war.

• This article is written by Abu Dhar al-Bosni (lokiloptr154668 on X) and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the website), nor does it necessarily represent an agreement with these perspectives.