The Inevitable Alliance: How Realpolitik Will Force Jolani Toward an Iran–Hezbullah Partnership Despite His Adherence to Sunnah of Zarqawi.

As previously elaborated in my book and on social media, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani adheres to the ideological legacy of Zarqawi, the "Sunnah of Zarqawi." This doctrine fundamentally prioritizes the targeting of Iran and Shia groups as a core religious-strategic imperative, even if such actions necessitate tacit cooperation or tactical alignments with Israel or the West against shared Shia adversaries.

However, the immutable realities of Syria's geopolitical position will inevitably force Jolani—should he aspire to establish and maintain a durable regime controlling the Syrian state—to embrace realpolitik principles that starkly contradict this foundational ideology. Specifically, Syria's geographic challenge acts as the primary driver of this compulsion.

Syria exists in a state of permanent double encirclement, a defining feature of its strategic landscape since independence. It is simultaneously:

1. Sandwiched between two historically hostile, expansionist non-Arab powers: Turkey and Israel. Both possess explicit or deeply rooted ambitions to annex or exert direct control over significant portions of Syrian territory (e.g., Turkish designs on northern Syria, Israeli claims/occupation of the Golan Heights).

2. Sandwiched between two Arab states: Lebanon and Iraq. While not harboring overt annexationist ambitions against Syria itself, and often perceived culturally and historically as "brother nations," these states are integral components of the Iran-led "Axis of Resistance" (AoR).

3. Given Turkey’s NATO membership, decades of security cooperation with Israel, and both states’ aversion to mutual escalation, leveraging Turkish military power against Israel remains politically unviable—neither state seeks direct confrontation.

   
   

The fundamental laws of political survival and statecraft dictate that any Syrian regime prioritizing its longevity and the preservation of the state's territorial integrity must strategically align with powers that do not seek its dismemberment, against those that demonstrably do. This principle stems from the core national interest of ensuring sovereignty and survival against existential threats. Indeed, the enduring alliance of Bashar al-Assad's regime with Hezbollah and Iranian-backed Iraqi non-state actors was not an aberration but the natural geopolitical consequence of this imperative. It reflected a rational calculation based on Syria's vulnerable position. Even during periods of intense hostility between Hafez al-Assad and Saddam Hussein, the conflict, while severe, never escalated to the level of an existential threat comparable to that posed by Israel or the potential posed by Turkey. Crucially, Saddam, as an Arab leader, held no legitimate territorial claims on Syrian land, making him a fundamentally different category of adversary. Bashar al-Assad's support for Iraqi Sunni insurgencies—including tactical alliances with ex-Baathists—to prevent a hostile pro-American regime in Iraq further underscores this political reality.

Jolani's current trajectory, heavily influenced by the anti-Shia "Sunnah of Zarqawi," represents a profound strategic miscalculation. He is attempting to orient a putative Syrian state towards alliances with powers whose actions fundamentally undermine Syria's national integrity. This includes implicit or tactical understandings with actors like Israel, driven solely by the shared immediate objective of countering Shia influence. Jolani operates under the perilous illusion that such actors—specifically Israel and Turkey—would ultimately respect Syrian territorial unity under his rule. He mistakenly believes that Israel would refrain from exploiting opportunities to further carve out or solidify control over areas like the Golan Heights or potentially facilitate Kurdish or Druze autonomy movements detrimental to Damascus. This grave miscalculation demonstrated the futility of such an alliance when Israel simultaneously supported the Syrian Druze factions and bombed Damascus' Presidential Palace and Defense Ministry—actions that rendered political cooperation with Israel nearly impossible. Similarly, he seems to trust that Turkey, despite its extensive occupation of northern Syria and overt support for Syrian factions somewhat challenging Damascus, would willingly relinquish control and leave a Jolani-led government secure in Damascus.

Therefore, any sustainable Syrian state, regardless of its ideological character, faces an unavoidable strategic imperative: it must forge a deep, strategic alliance with Lebanon and Iraq. Given the current power structures within these nations, this effectively necessitates an alignment with the AoR and its patron, Iran. Failure to do so neglects the fundamental geopolitical laws governing Syria's existence. A state that isolates itself from these neighbors and aligns instead with powers actively seeking its territorial diminishment is, geopolitically speaking, a dead state walking, inevitably destined for fragmentation or subjugation. Realpolitik, demanding an alliance focused on deterring annexationist threats, will inevitably supersede the dictates of Zarqawi's legacy if regime survival is the goal.