The Geopolitics of Insurgency: The Critical Role of Foreign Training for Revolutionary Movements

The capacity of revolutionary movements to project power and sustain prolonged conflicts is often less a function of their intrinsic strength and more a reflection of their ability to secure external patronage. A critical component of this support is access to safe havens for military training. As elucidated in Abu Musab al-Suri's 2004 treatise, Call to Global Islamic Resistance, the practice of "open training under the protection of a country of asylum" has been a historical linchpin for both Islamist and non-Islamist insurgent groups. This analysis examines this phenomenon, arguing that the provision of foreign training bases is a potent instrument of proxy warfare, one that has historically allowed states to exert influence while enabling non-state actors to develop sophisticated military capabilities they could not otherwise attain.

The Golden Age of State-Sponsored Sanctuary

In his work, al-Suri nostalgically refers to the period from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s as a time when this model was "very reliable." This era, preceding what he terms the "launching of the New World Order"—a reference to the post-Cold War unipolar moment dominated by the United States—was characterized by intense regional rivalries and superpower competition. These conflicts created permissive environments where states willingly hosted and trained another country's insurgents as a low-cost means of undermining their adversaries.

Al-Suri provides firsthand accounts of this system in action. During the early 1980s, Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and other jihadist fighters opposing the Hafez al-Assad regime established developed bases in Iraq. With "tremendous military support and material" from Saddam Hussein's government, these camps produced a generation of fighters proficient in everything from light infantry tactics to the use of heavy weapons. Similarly, he notes limited training was facilitated by Jordanian intelligence under King Hussein, and that a specialized Syrian team received high-level urban guerrilla warfare training from Egyptian intelligence agencies in 1981. This latter instance was a direct consequence of the political crisis between Anwar Sadat and other Arab states following the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty.

These examples underscore a key dynamic: the training was not clandestine, but an open, state-sanctioned activity. The host state's intelligence agencies often directly supervised the training, ensuring it aligned with their own geopolitical objectives. This transformed insurgent groups into formal proxies, leveraging interstate animosities for their own benefit.

A Global Pattern: From the Levant to Western Europe

The utility of this model was not lost on a diverse array of militant organizations. Al-Suri’s list demonstrates its adoption across ideological and geographical lines, revealing a universal strategic logic.

• Islamist and Arab Nationalist Movements: The primary beneficiaries included Syrian jihadists, Shia groups opposed to Saddam Hussein (operating from Syria, Iran, and Lebanon), and virtually all major Palestinian factions, which established training infrastructures across the Arab world, from Jordan and Syria to Sudan and Iran. Lebanese Hezbollah, itself a product of Iranian training, later became a training hub for other groups, including Egyptian Islamist organizations.

• Secular and Nationalist Movements: Crucially, the strategy extended far beyond the Islamist sphere. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) long benefited from safe havens and training in Syria, Lebanon, and northern Iraq. Similarly, the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), an Iranian leftist organization, received extensive training and basing rights in Iraq to conduct cross-border operations against the Islamic Republic. Perhaps the most illustrative examples of this transnational reach are the secular European militant groups: both the Basque ETA and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) are noted to have received training and support in various Arab and Middle Eastern countries, seeking expertise they could not acquire at home.

  
  

This pattern confirms that the imperative for advanced military training is a strategic constant, transcending the specific ideology of the insurgent group. For host states, the ideology of the group was often secondary to its utility as a tool against a common enemy.

The Erosion of the Model and Its Contemporary Relevance

Al-Suri correctly identifies the mid-1990s as the beginning of the end for this era of "open training." The catalyst was the increased global security cooperation, particularly after the Cold War, which saw the United States exert greater influence over the intelligence and military apparatuses of allied Arab states. The Global War on Terror after 9/11 accelerated this trend, making overt state sponsorship of jihadist groups politically untenable and logistically hazardous due to enhanced international surveillance and counter-terrorism cooperation.

However, to declare the model entirely obsolete would be premature. While the age of "open" bases may have passed, the underlying principle of foreign training persists in more deniable and complex forms. The reliance of Afghan mujahideen on Pakistani support in the 1980s, the training of Ukrainian separatists in Russia prior to 2014, and Iran's ongoing program of training and advising Shia groups across the Middle East through the Quds Force all demonstrate the enduring utility of this strategy.

Conclusion: An Enduring Feature of Asymmetric Conflict

In conclusion, the history of foreign training for revolutionary movements is not a mere footnote but a central theme in modern asymmetric warfare. As detailed by strategists like Abu Musab al-Suri, it has been a critical enabler for groups ranging from the PKK to the Palestinian factions. While the unipolar post-Cold War moment constrained this model, it has not eradicated it. The fundamental logic—that a hostile state can magnify its influence by providing a sanctuary for another's enemies—remains a potent and enduring feature of global conflict, likely to reemerge wherever geopolitical competition creates new spaces for such partnerships to thrive.

• This article is written by Abu Dhar al-Bosni (lokiloptr154668 on X) and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the website), nor does it necessarily represent an agreement with these perspectives.