The Forgotten Front: Soleimani's 2014 Attempt to Forge a Sunni-Shia Axis in Yemen

A previously unreported diplomatic initiative in 2014, spearheaded by the late Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, reveals a bold and ultimately unfulfilled strategy to create a Sunni-Shia alliance against their common adversary, Saudi Arabia. This attempt, which unfolded on Turkish soil, underscores the complex and often pragmatic nature of regional alliances that can transcend the sectarian divide.

The Secret Summit in Turkey

According to a leaked Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) cable published by The Intercept, in 2014, Hajj Rahim Noei-Aqdam (also identified in the cable as Abu Hussain), an Azeri deputy to Qasem Soleimani, led a delegation of senior Quds Force officials to Turkey. The original plan was for Soleimani himself to attend, but the Turkish government, despite its good relations with both Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood, reportedly refused to grant him a visa due to his high profile. The meeting was therefore held in his stead.

The Muslim Brotherhood was represented by three of its most prominent Egyptian leaders in exile: Ibrahim Munir Mustafa, Mahmoud El-Abiary, and Youssef Moustafa Nada. The latter had previously been sanctioned by the U.S. and U.N. under allegations of financing Al-Qaeda, though these restrictions were lifted in 2009 for lack of evidence. (In a subsequent interview with The Intercept, Nada denied ever attending such a meeting).

A Pragmatic Proposal: Uniting Against the "Common Enemy"

The MOIS cable details a conversation grounded in pragmatic realism. Both sides acknowledged their "indisputable" ideological differences, with Iran representing the Shia world and the Brotherhood the Sunni world. However, they emphasized the need to "focus on joint grounds for cooperation." The most powerful of these was a shared animosity towards Saudi Arabia, which they identified as the "common enemy" of both Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The delegation from the Brotherhood then presented a concrete proposal for collaboration: Yemen. With the Houthi insurgency against the Saudi-backed government escalating, they saw a strategic opportunity. The Brotherhood argued that "in Yemen, with the influence of Iran on Houthis and the influence of the Brotherhood on the armed tribal Sunni factions, there should be a joint effort to decrease the conflict between Houthis and Sunni tribes to be able to use their strength against Saudi Arabia."

Confirmation and Contradiction

The story was later corroborated from an unexpected source. Fars News Agency, a media arm of the IRGC, published an intelligence report citing senior Muslim Brotherhood leader Ibrahim Al-Mounir—one of the figures named in the original leak—as confirming that the 2014 meeting did indeed take place. However, Al-Mounir sought to downplay its significance, stating that there was no discussion of a formal alliance against Saudi Arabia and that the Brotherhood did not request Iranian support against the Egyptian government.

Strategic Context and Eventual Outcome

This initiative must be understood in its proper context. The anti-Saudi elements of the Muslim Brotherhood engaging with Iran were largely represented by exiled figures from the ousted Morsi administration in Egypt. These were effectively Quds Force-backed rogue elements operating outside the Brotherhood's mainstream international consensus. The Brotherhood's official Yemeni affiliate, the Islah Party, has remained consistently pro-Saudi and continues to be a key part of the Saudi-led coalition opposing the Houthis.

While the 2014 attempt to broker a direct Houthi-Brotherhood tribal alliance failed, the strategic objective of neutralizing Sunni tribal opposition in Yemen endured. Over the following years, the Ansar Allah-led revolutionary government successfully pursued this goal independently, convincing numerous Sunni tribes—some with historical ties to the Muslim Brotherhood—to either defect from the Saudi coalition or remain neutral, thereby refusing to fight against Ansar Allah. This grassroots success in building a domestic Yemeni consensus ultimately proved more impactful than the top-down alliance that Soleimani had once envisioned.

• This article is written by Abu Dhar al-Bosni (lokiloptr154668 on X) and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the website), nor does it necessarily represent an agreement with these perspectives.