The Architect of Chaos: How Ali Abdullah Saleh’s “dancing on the heads of snakes” Fueled the Rise of the Houthis

The political history of modern Yemen is often described as “dancing on the heads of snakes”—a phrase jokingly coined by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to describe the delicate art of balancing the country's myriad tribes, factions, and rivalries. Yet, Saleh was not merely a dancer navigating a pre-existing pit of snakes; he was a master breeder who nurtured his most dangerous enemy himself. His decades-long strategy of playing rivals against one another, particularly his cynical cultivation of the Houthi movement to settle a personal score, ultimately set the stage for the war that would consume the nation and claim his own life.

The Genesis of a Rivalry: Saleh vs. Ali Mohsen

The central political conflict that would define Yemen’s future began not as a sectarian war, but as a personal power struggle within the regime’s inner sanctum. Following Yemen’s unification in 1990, President Saleh began preparing for a dynastic succession, envisioning his son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, as his heir.

This plan was vehemently opposed by his powerful cousin, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, a key military commander who believed his own leadership and battlefield credentials made him the rightful successor. By 1997, this enmity between the two most powerful men in Sana’a had become an open secret, creating a fatal crack in the foundation of the Yemeni state.

Rather than confront Ali Mohsen directly, Saleh employed his classic strategy of controlled chaos. He identified the Zaydi Shia revivalist movement led by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi as a potential counterweight to Ali Mohsen, whose power base was built on Sunni Islamist networks, including the Islah Party. Saudi Arabia had also used similar tactics, supporting the Islah Party and its affiliated Ahmar tribe to keep Saleh himself off-balance. Now, Saleh would use a new force against his domestic rival.

A Cynical Gambit: Weaponizing the Houthis

The Saada region, the Houthis’ heartland, became the proxy battlefield for Saleh’s vendetta. General Ali Mohsen, as the head of the Yemeni Army’s Northwestern Military District, was tasked with suppressing the Houthi rebellion. However, Saleh, as commander-in-chief, deliberately ensured the military campaigns were ineffective. He made sure the Houthis survived and got stronger. This calculated move served a dual purpose: it bled Ali Mohsen’s military resources and political capital, while simultaneously fostering a hardened, battle-tested insurgent group that was entirely dependent on Saleh’s tacit protection.

The Pivotal Betrayal: The Fall of Amran

The culmination of this strategy came in 2014, the year the Houthis would seize the capital. Even after being forced from power following the 2011 Arab Spring uprising, Saleh retained a powerful network of loyalists within the army and state institutions. He used this residual power to orchestrate his ultimate revenge.

The Houthis, now a formidable military force, positioned themselves to take the city of Amran, a strategic gateway to Sana’a. The city was defended by a garrison under General Ali Hamad, a key subordinate of Ali Mohsen who had fought the Houthis for years. In a fateful phone call, a intermediary asked Saleh if the Houthis had his permission to take Amran. Saleh’s reply was a chilling, “be my guest.”

The intermediary then relayed the next question: “They want Ali Hamad.” Instead of a direct order, Saleh revealed his personal animus, calling the general "the dog of the Arabs.” This was signal enough. Saleh then contacted officers in the army still loyal to him and ordered them to pull their forces back, deliberately isolating Ali Hamad. Amran fell, the general was eliminated, and the path to Sana’a was left wide open for the Houthi takeover. Saleh had handed his rivals’ greatest stronghold to his former proxies.

The Irony of Origins: The “Temporary” President

The story of Saleh’s downfall is deeply ironic given his improbable rise. He assumed the presidency of North Yemen in 1978 after a period of extreme instability. Within a 24-hour period in June 1978, both North Yemeni President Ahmed al-Ghashmi and the President of South Yemen were assassinated. In the ensuing power vacuum, few were willing to step into a role seen as a death sentence.

Ali Abdullah Saleh, then a military officer with a favorable reputation among his peers, was installed as a compromise candidate. He was subsequently elected, becoming the first directly elected president in the Arabian Peninsula. Western intelligence agencies, including the CIA, assessed him as a temporary figure—a weak, soft-spoken leader who would not last in Yemen’s treacherous political landscape.

They were profoundly wrong. Saleh would rule for 33 years, not through brute force alone, but through the intricate and ruthless “dance” of balancing competing powers. In the end, however, the same enemies he had nurtured for decades—particularly the Houthi movement—finally turned and struck him down, a testament to the ultimate futility of a strategy built on perpetual conflict and betrayal.