The 1985-86 Hezbollah-Amal Conflict and the Syrian-Iranian Strategic Divide

Introduction: Shia Fratricide in the Lebanese Civil War

The conflict known as the "War of the Brothers" (1985-86) represented a critical but often overlooked episode within Lebanon's broader civil war (1975-90). This bloody confrontation between Hezbollah and the Syrian-backed Amal Movement erupted in and around Palestinian refugee camps, deriving its name from the shared Shia identity of both combatant organizations. What makes this conflict particularly significant is its revelation of the complex, often contradictory alliances that characterized the Lebanese civil war, where ideological alignment and sectarian identity frequently clashed with geopolitical calculations.

The Iranian Factions: Rafsanjani vs. Khamenei

The internal dynamics of Iranian support played a decisive role in shaping Hezbollah's controversial decision to side with Palestinian factions against the Syrian regime—a remarkable position given Syria's status as Iran's primary Arab ally. During this period, Hezbollah was dominated by Shaykh Subhi al-Tufayli's faction, which enjoyed the support of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then-President of Iran. However, within Hezbollah's leadership structure, the faction comprising Hasan Nasrallah and Imad Mughniyeh—backed by Imam Ali Khamenei (then Iran's Supreme Leader-in-waiting)—remained a minority. This internal power imbalance would prove crucial in determining Hezbollah's alignment during the Brothers' War.

The key drivers of Hezbollah's pro-Palestinian policy were not Lebanese actors alone, but rather a cadre of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders who maintained deep, personal connections to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

The IRGC's Palestinian Faction: Key Figures

Several senior IRGC figures emerged as the critical architects of the Iran-Hezbollah-PLO axis during this period:

Seyyed Mehdi Hashemi

Commander Mehdi Hashemi, brother-in-law of Martyr Montazeri (son of Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri), represented a fascinating nexus of regional jihadist networks. Having trained Afghan Mujahideen against Soviet forces in the 1980s, Hashemi himself had received military training from Yasser Arafat's Fatah in Lebanon during the 1970s. His Palestinian connection ran so deep that he later leaked details of the Iran-Contra Affair—an act for which he was executed in 1987, allegedly paying with his life for this dangerous disclosure.

Mohammad Saleh Hosseini

As Iranian military attaché in Beirut and Imam Khomeini's personal envoy to Fatah, Hosseini served as the critical link between Tehran's highest authority and Palestinian military structures. His assassination by Iraqi agents (presumably Ba'athist operatives loyal to Saddam Hussein) underscored the lethal nature of these regional competitions.

Ayatollah Ali Akbar Mohtashamipur

Iran's Ambassador to Damascus, Mohtashamipur never concealed his passionate support for the Palestinian cause. His diplomatic position in Syria made him a crucial but potentially awkward figure, given his sympathies ran counter to Syrian regime interests during the Brothers' War.

Seyyed Ahmad Khomeini

The Supreme Leader's own son, who had likewise trained with Arafat's Fatah in the 1970s, added significant religious-ideological weight to the pro-Palestinian faction within Iran's ruling elite.

These figures, alongside Shaykh Tufayli, consistently advised Hezbollah to support the Palestinians against both Nabih Berri's Amal Movement and Hafez al-Assad's Syria—a recommendation that put them at odds with Syria's strategic interests and, eventually, with Iran's own evolving priorities.

The Strategic Context: Hostages and Syrian-Iranian Friction

The alignment between Hezbollah and Palestinian factions was not merely ideological but deeply intertwined with the lucrative and politically sensitive hostage-taking enterprise of the 1980s. As Lebanese journalist Talal Salman presciently observed in Al-Safir on June 27, 1985: "After the failure of the attempt with Walid Jumblatt, it was logical for the [Lebanese] government to rush towards the Shiites, and to attempt to collude with them. It initially tried to collude with all those harmed by the growing power of the Amal Movement and the increasing role of Nabih Berri."

While Salman did not explicitly name Hezbollah, the reality was unmistakable: Hezbollah fought alongside the PLO against Ba'athist Syria. This alignment directly correlated with Syrian-Iranian friction over the hostages file. Syria, seeking to normalize relations with the West and stabilize Lebanon, wanted the hostage crisis resolved. Iran and Hezbollah, conversely, had powerful incentives to prolong it, as Tehran successfully leveraged hostages to secure American weapons for its war against Iraq—what would later be exposed as the Iran-Contra scandal.

The Saraya Al-Jihad Connection: A Case Study in PLO-Hezbollah Cooperation

Perhaps the most concrete evidence of the PLO-Hezbollah alliance during this period lies in the operations of Saraya Al-Jihad, a joint venture between Fatah and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. This little-documented organization served as a direct conduit for tactical cooperation between Palestinian and Lebanese Shia militants. Abdullah Isa, a Fatah commander and senior figure in Saraya Al-Jihad, later confirmed that fighters from this organization—some of whom would later participate in Al-Qaeda campaigns in Afghanistan—received specialized training from Hezbollah in suicide bombing operations during 1986-87. This knowledge transfer would prove devastatingly consequential, as these techniques later proliferated across global jihadist networks.

The logistical architecture of this cooperation centered on Cyprus. As Isa explained in a 2006 interview with Donya Al-Watan: "Colonel Marwan Al-Kayyali resided in Cyprus and had undertaken numerous missions for the movement, including sending trainees to Lebanon to receive training in Hezbollah camps, where Hezbollah's relationship with the movement was strong."

This Cypriot connection served multiple functions. The Mediterranean island provided a secure channel linking the PLO's political headquarters in Tunisia (where Arafat operated) with its military leadership in Lebanon (under Abu Jihad). Through Cyprus, PLO fighters could be deployed to Hezbollah's training camps in the Beqaa Valley, safely removed from the direct surveillance of Syrian intelligence. Colonel Kayyali's role extended beyond mere logistics. His presence in Cyprus enabled him to establish connections with foreigners traveling to Israel, including an American journalist who managed to infiltrate the Israeli Prime Minister's Office.

The End of the Brothers' War: Ayatollah Khamenei's Ascendance and Its Lasting Legacy

The Brothers' War effectively concluded around 1989-90. When Ayatollah Khamenei succeeded Ayatollah Khomeini as Iran's Supreme Leader in 1989, his allies—Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah and Imad Mughniyeh—correspondingly ascended within Hezbollah's hierarchy, displacing Tufayli's faction. This internal Iranian power transition had immediate consequences in Lebanon: Hezbollah and Amal ceased their fratricidal conflict and established a modus vivendi that has persisted to the present day. The strategic alliance with the PLO, facilitated by the Rafsanjani-backed Tufayli faction, consequently faded as Iran's priorities realigned under Khamenei's leadership.

Conclusion

What demands emphasis in any historical assessment of this period is the paradoxical but durable nature of Hezbollah's relationship with the Palestinian cause. Regardless of Amal's brutal actions against Palestinian refugees during 1985-86—and those actions were indeed severe—Hezbollah itself has never engaged in systematic oppression of Palestinians in Lebanon. To the contrary, the organization has consistently positioned itself as Palestine's defender, a stance it maintains through its current support for Palestinian groups.

• This article is written by Abu Dhar al-Bosni (lokiloptr154668 on X) and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the website), nor does it necessarily represent an agreement with these perspectives.