Revolutionary Vanguard: Khomeinism's Roadmap from an Islamic State to a Civilizational Bloc

Khomeinism's Strategic Framework

Introduction: Beyond the Sectarian Lens

The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, often termed "Khomeinist," is frequently misunderstood through a reductionist, sectarian lens. A deeper analysis reveals a complex theoretical architecture built on three core tenets, which, when combined with a fourth, foundational principle, form a coherent strategic worldview.

The Three Pillars of Khomeinist Foreign Policy

The three primary tenets are:

1. Pan-Islamism over Sectarianism: The ideology prioritizes Muslim unity against common adversaries, explicitly rejecting sectarian division as a tool of colonial powers.

2. Synthetized Nationalism and Internationalism: This is the dual practice of defending the national homeland while simultaneously supporting liberation struggles abroad. This is exemplified by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) defending Iran against Saddam Hussein's Iraq while also facilitating volunteers to fight Israel in Lebanon. Similarly, Hezbollah fights for Lebanese liberation while deploying fighters to defend Muslims in Bosnia.

3. Anti-Imperialism as a Primary Contradiction: The doctrine identifies foreign Kuffar (unbeliever) imperialists as the principal enemy of the entire Muslim world, a threat that transcends sectarian identity.

   
   

The Fourth Pillar: The Imperative of the Popular Front

However, a fourth, often overlooked element is essential to understanding the practical application of this theory: its inherently popular-frontist character. The concept of the Umm al-Qura (the "Mother of Villages," a term for Mecca denoting a model state) has always been, in essence, a broad coalition.

This popular front model is not an afterthought but a strategic necessity. Consider its manifestations:

• In Yemen, Ansarallah's governance model incorporates Sunnis, Southerners, former loyalists of Ali Abdullah Saleh, and defectors from the opposing camp, with the Zaydi Ansarallah movement serving as the guiding vanguard.

• In Lebanon, Hezbollah's "March 8 Alliance" operates on a "Party-Army-People" principle—a concept Hassan Nasrallah introduced into political Islam from Maoist theory. This framework has, in practice, strengthened a unified Lebanese national identity while actively dismantling the sectarian divisions engineered by the Sykes-Picot agreement. Hezbollah positions itself not as a dictator, but as the vanguard of a wider resistance movement.

  
  

Even within Iran itself—a state that is majority Shia and 99% Muslim—the Khomeinist system rejected a narrow clerical dictatorship, as advocated by hardliners like Taqi Mesbah Yazdi. Instead, Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei consciously constructed a wide popular front. This coalition includes the liberal-reformist middle class and the anti-capitalist, Ali Shariati-inspired proletarian elements within factions of the IRGC itself.

A Historical Imperative: The Mass-Based Revolution

The reason for this is historical. The 1979 Revolution was a mass upheaval, unique in its scale of popular participation; an estimated 10 million out of 60 million Iranians were directly or indirectly involved. In such a context, it was politically impossible to disenfranchise this broad base and impose rule by a small clerical elite. The revolution was an all-class revolution, and such a phenomenon can only be sustained through a popular front. This imperative explains why diverse figures like the socialist-influenced Mahmoud Taleghani became the Imam of Tehran, and why the Western-educated middle class, through figures like Ali Akbar Velayati, led the Foreign Ministry for decades.

The Model's Adoption: From Shia Vanguard to Sunni Emulation

The success of this model is demonstrated by its adoption by successful Sunni movements. Hamas governs Gaza in collaboration with the military wings of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, and various Popular Resistance Committees, viewing them as fellow freedom fighters rather than suppressing them. Similarly, the Taliban 2.0, in stark contrast to the blind sectarianism of its first iteration, has actively fought ISIS, discouraged Takfirism, permitted Shia Husseiniyas, and even appointed a Hazara Shia as a deputy minister. Even Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, while Emir of Idlib, praised Hezbollah for its social services and its synthesis of Islamism and nationalism—his own Idlib emirate being a form of popular front, albeit one limited to Salafi organizations.

The Grand Strategy: The Theory of Stages and Umm al-Qura

This brings us to the grand strategic theory. Imam Khomeini envisioned the Shia clergy and its revolutionary guard as the vanguard of a global Islamic revolution. This is not an expression of sectarianism, but a reflection of the objective reality that, in the late 20th century, these were the forces with the most concrete experience in actually constituting and governing an Islamic state. The Sunni equivalent would be a major Sunni country—such as Turkey, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia—successfully executing a popular Islamic revolution, transforming into a Sharia-governed polity, withstanding the inevitable imperialist war (as Iran withstood Saddam's invasion), and consolidating its system to become a guiding light for the Muslim world.

This process is formalized in the Theory of Stages, articulated by Supreme Leader Khamenei. The stages are:

Islamic Revolution → Islamic System → Islamic Government → Islamic Society → Islamic Civilization.

This theory, some argue, is a modification of Marxist historical stages, while others trace its origins to the classical Shia scholar Sheikh Mufid. Crucially, the theory posits that progress along this chain is linear and must be defended at all costs; regression is an existential threat. Once the stage of "Islamic Government" is achieved, it cannot be abandoned, as its destruction risks a catastrophic return to a state of Jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance).

Understanding this theory of stages, and viewing the Islamic state as the Umm al-Qura—the nerve center of the Axis of Resistance—is key to deciphering strategic decisions that might otherwise seem puzzling. For instance, it clarifies why Iran did not enter a full-scale war with the "Anglo-Zionist bloc" in direct defense of Gaza on October 8th. From this theoretical perspective, such a move without the deterrent of nuclear weapons—which, as the late Ayatollah Beheshti argued, are critical for an Islamic government to advance to the stage of Islamic Civilization—would be an unacceptable gamble. The loss of Yemen, while a severe setback, would not be catastrophic for the entire project. However, the loss of Iran, the Umm al-Qura itself, would mean the collapse of the entire chain, halting the long-term march toward an Islamic Civilization. What critics dismiss as "cowardice" is, within this framework, a calculated strategy of survival and long-term historical progression. This framework, therefore, is not merely a set of foreign policy directives but a comprehensive historical and political roadmap for what its proponents see as the ultimate redemption of the Muslim world.

• This article is written by Abu Dhar al-Bosni (lokiloptr154668 on X) and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the website), nor does it necessarily represent an agreement with these perspectives.