Khaled Meshal and Haj Khalil Harb: The 1997 Strategic Defeat for Mossad and Netanyahu

September 4, 1997: A Coordinated Strategic Defeat for Mossad and Netanyahu

Introduction: Two Men, Two Fiascos, One Strategic Lesson

The history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is punctuated by operations that alter the strategic landscape. Among the most significant are not just successes, but catastrophic failures that expose vulnerabilities and embolden adversaries. Two such events, occurring within the same pivotal month of September 1997, represent profound fiascos for Israel's intelligence and military apparatus and for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These operations, aimed at decapitating the leadership of Hezbollah and Hamas, instead resulted in humiliating defeat, strategic concessions, and a lasting lesson in the resilience of these resistance movements.

The two figures central to these events, Haj Khalil Harb of Hezbollah and Khaled Meshal of Hamas, not only survived but thrived, their legacies and operational command extending for decades. Their survival underscores a critical and persistent challenge to Israeli strategy.

Picture 1: Haj Khalil Harb (also known as "Sayyid Ahmad" or "Abu Mustafa"), commander-in-chief of Hezbollah's military wing as of 2025, commander of Hezbollah's central military operations in 1997.

Picture 2: Khaled Meshal, a Hamas politburo member as of 2025, Hamas' most senior leader in 1997.

Both men are alive today, but both came perilously close to death in September 1997, in two of the Mossad's and Israeli Defense Forces' most significant operational failures to that date.

Part I: The Ambush at Ansariya – Hezbollah’s Tactical Masterpiece

The Primary Target: The Ascent of Haj Khalil Harb

On the night of September 4, 1997, Israel's elite naval commandos, Shayetet 13, launched a high-risk operation into Southern Lebanon. Their objective was to capture Haj Khalil Harb, then Hezbollah's number two military chief, subordinate only to the famed Imad Mughniyeh. The high value placed on Harb by Israeli intelligence is corroborated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, which in 2017 placed a $5 million bounty on his head. Their press release detailed his long and escalating career:

• Deputy commander in Hezbollah’s central military unit in southern Lebanon (1988-1992)

• Lead commander of the unit (1992-1994)

• Commander of Hezbollah’s central military operations (1994-1997)

His significance only grew after surviving the 1997 operation. The Treasury noted that by 2000, Harb supervised Hezbollah military operations inside Israel, Jordan, Cyprus, and Turkey. He led a special unit in the 2006 war and was involved in smuggling Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad operatives into the West Bank. By March 2006, he served as Hezbollah’s chief of military liaison with Palestinian factions and Iran.

In early 2007, Harb ascended to lead Hezbollah’s Unit 1800, dedicated to “supporting Palestinian militants and conducting Hizballah operations in the countries surrounding Israel.” In this role, he traveled to Iran for high-level coordination meetings. In 2010, he was involved in planning retaliatory attacks for Imad Mughniyeh's assassination and was made a “special advisor” to Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah.

His portfolio expanded further: by 2012, he was involved in Hezbollah’s activities in Yemen, moving "large amounts of currency" through Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. By 2017, he was actively training and advising the Houthi (Ansarallah) movement. Notably, and curiously unlike other senior Hezbollah commanders, his public biography does not mention direct involvement in the Syrian Civil War. In 2021, he became head of Hezbollah's Unit 133 for operations against Israel from the Golan Heights and the West Bank. Following the martyrdom of Fuad Shukr and Ibrahim Aqil in 2024, he is now the highest-ranking military commander in Hezbollah and the effective Number Two in the organization after Sheikh Naim Qassem.

The Setup: Intelligence and Meticulous Preparation

However, on September 4, 1997, Harb was not a distant commander but an active planner in the field. Alongside the two now-martyred leaders of the Radwan Force, Ibrahim Aqil and Ahmad Wehbe, he orchestrated what would become one of the most devastating ambushes in the history of the Israeli army.

Hezbollah’s preparation was a masterpiece of counter-intelligence. As revealed by Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah in a 2010 interview, the group had acquired Israeli drones and successfully downloaded video footage from their reconnaissance flights over Lebanon. In August 1997, analysts noticed a persistent Israeli interest in the area around Ansariya. The drones repeatedly followed a specific path from the beach, through citrus groves, to a point north of the village. Hezbollah correctly deduced a commando raid was being planned for that exact route.

They decided to preemptively plant explosives along the path. This presented two major problems. First, the timing was unknown, and the groves were worked by local farmers during the day. To avoid civilian casualties, the explosives had to be laid each evening after sunset and removed each morning before daybreak—a labor-intensive and risky process. Second, the area was a weak spot for Hezbollah, being dominated by the allied but rival Shiite movement, AMAL. Hezbollah leadership contacted local AMAL officials, warned them of the impending operation, and secured not only their consent but also an offer of a backup fighter unit.

The Hezbollah ambush unit consisted of 20 local militia fighters, led by Ahmad Wehbe. The overall strategic planning was the work of three senior leaders: Mustafa Badreddine (martyred in 2016), Ibrahim Aqil (martyred in 2024), and Khalil Harb. According to later Israeli sources, several similar ambushes were prepared at different locations as a contingency.

The Execution: A Tactical Annihilation

On the evening of September 4, 1997, a 16-strong Shayetet 13 team, commanded by Lt. Col. Yosef Korakin, landed on an uninhabited beach and moved inland, precisely following the route Hezbollah had predicted. They were shadowed by Israeli drones relaying their progress to command.

The unit reached a walled orchard. The forward team breached an iron gate. As the main force passed through it, a remote-controlled Claymore-type mine exploded. Fourteen seconds later, as the forward team returned to the site, a second mine detonated, killing the Israeli commander. The mines, designed to spray lethal metal marbles, caused chaos. Hezbollah fighters then opened fire, triggering the explosives carried by one Israeli soldier. In less than four minutes, eleven soldiers were dead, and four were wounded. Only the radioman escaped unhurt, and he frantically called for support and evacuation.

The Israeli response was swift and chaotic. Cobra attack helicopters laid down suppressing fire with TOW missiles and 20mm chain guns. Reinforcements from the elite Sayeret Matkal and the Air Force's Unit 669 rescue team were brought in by CH-53 helicopters. A fierce firefight ensued. After two Hezbollah fighters were lightly wounded, their command ordered a pullback. AMAL fighters continued to engage with rifles and RPGs before also withdrawing. Hezbollah, however, continued to mortar the Israeli position.

The collateral damage was significant. Captain Dagesh Maher, a Druze military doctor in the rescue team, was mortally wounded by mortar shrapnel. A Lebanese civilian couple driving by was fired upon by Israeli soldiers; the woman was killed, and the man severely wounded. A young girl was also killed in the crossfire. The Lebanese army fired anti-aircraft guns skyward and launched illumination rounds. An Israeli jet struck a Lebanese anti-aircraft position, and Israeli missile boats offshore shelled the village to silence mortar fire, damaging several houses.

After more than four hours, the last Israeli helicopter evacuated the dead and wounded. One soldier, Itamar Ilya, remained missing, his body blown to pieces by the detonation of his own explosives.

The Aftermath: A Strategic Victory for Hezbollah

The strategic outcome was a resounding victory for Hezbollah. On May 25, 1998, the remains of the soldiers were exchanged for 65 Lebanese prisoners and the bodies of 40 Hezbollah fighters and Lebanese soldiers, including that of Hadi Nasrallah, the 19-year-old son of Hassan Nasrallah.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called it "one of the worst tragedies that has ever occurred to us." This incident, coupled with a helicopter crash earlier that year that killed 73 soldiers, became a powerful catalyst for Israeli public disillusionment, directly contributing to Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000—a event celebrated by Hezbollah as a historic victory.

Part II: The Meshal Assassination Attempt – A Diplomatic Catastrophe

The Jerusalem Bombing and the Decision to Retaliate

On that very same day, September 4, 1997, hundreds of miles to the south, a coordinated Hamas operation was underway. Five suicide bombers simultaneously detonated themselves on Ben Yehuda Street in Jerusalem, killing 21 Israelis. The mastermind was Khaled Meshal, then Hamas's senior leader operating from Amman, Jordan. He had enlisted expert bomb-maker Mahmoud Abu Hanoud and dispatched the bombers.

In retaliation, Netanyahu personally authorized Meshal's assassination.

The Botched Mossad Operation

On September 25, 1997, Mossad agents using fake Canadian passports infiltrated Amman. Two agents waited outside Meshal's office. As he entered, one agent came from behind and applied a device to his ear that administered a fast-acting, lethal poison. Meshal described the sensation as "a loud noise in my ear ... like a boom, like an electric shock."

The operation was critically flawed. Meshal's bodyguards, already suspicious, chased down and captured the two agents. Jordanian intelligence swiftly located and detained at least six other Mossad operatives involved in the mission. Initially feeling fine, Meshal soon developed a severe headache and began vomiting. His condition deteriorated rapidly, and he was rushed to a hospital, slipping into a coma.

The Diplomatic Crisis and Forced Capitulation

King Hussein of Jordan was furious. He threatened to sever diplomatic relations with Israel and put the captured Mossad agents on trial. Fearing Meshal's death would trigger riots or even civil war in his kingdom, he demanded Netanyahu provide the antidote. When Netanyahu refused, the king threatened to abrogate the landmark 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty.

Under this immense pressure and with U.S. President Bill Clinton personally intervening, Netanyahu was forced to capitulate. Mossad chief Danny Yatom flew to Jordan with the antidote. Doctors, who had diagnosed symptoms consistent with an opioid overdose, administered it, saving Meshal's life.

The price for the agents' release was exorbitant. According to sources like Ronen Bergman, the antidote only secured the release of the two direct operatives. The other agents holed up in the Israeli embassy were only released after Israel agreed to free Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and a large number of other Palestinian prisoners—a major strategic concession that significantly bolstered Hamas's prestige and morale.

In a 2008 interview, Meshal reflected on the attempt: "[It] made me more positive about life. I became more courageous in the face of death. My faith became stronger that a man does not die until his time comes. That is, I will die when God decides, not when Mossad decides. It also made me more resolute in fulfilling my responsibilities."

Conclusion: The Enduring Legacy of September 1997

The moral of this story is profound. Within the same month, two distinct Islamic Resistance Movements successfully defied the material and technological superiority of their adversary. They devised and executed bold offensive operations (the Jerusalem bombing, the ambush planning) and implemented effective, intelligent defenses against expected countermeasures (the drone intelligence, the ambush, the bodyguard response).

The result was a comprehensive strategic achievement: they achieved key military objectives, secured the release of important prisoners, and inflicted deep humiliation on the Israeli state. This embodies the "path of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam" that Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah articulated in his triumphant 2000 Bint Jbeil speech: a path of relentless resistance, meticulous alertness, and constant pressure, standing in stark opposition to capitulation and sloth.

A comparison made by an American colonel in 2009—"Hezbollah is the Delta Force, Hamas is the National Guard"—reflected the conventional wisdom of the time. It suggested a vast qualitative gap between the two organizations. However, the lessons of 1997, and their culmination on October 7, 2023, demonstrate that these are learning, evolving entities. On that day, Zionist settlers and soldiers learned the hard way that Hamas, after years of dedicated training and strategic development, had indeed achieved a level of operational capability that demanded a grim and tragic reassessment. The seeds of that reassessment were sown on a single, dark day in September 1997.

• This article is written by a friend of mine from Bosnia and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the Website), nor does it represent an agreement with these perspectives.