Jolani's hypocritical Relations with Russia and Iran in Post-Assad Syria

Introduction: The Strategic Landscape in Post-Assad Syria

The fall of the Syria in December 2024 marked a seismic shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics, creating a complex power vacuum that has forced all regional actors to recalibrate their strategies. At the center of this transformation is Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the leader of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), who has transitioned from jihadist leader to the de facto ruler of much of Syria. His recent interview on al-Ikhbariya television revealed crucial insights into his geopolitical calculations, particularly regarding relationships with Russia and Iran. 

2. The Russian Agreement: Pragmatism Over Principle

2.1. Strategic Calculations Behind the Rapprochement

Jolani's revelation that HTS reached an agreement with Russia during the conflict demonstrates a pragmatic approach to governance and survival. According to Jolani, "Russia reached an agreement with HTS while the war was ongoing," indicating backchannel communications that likely ensured Moscow's acquiescence to the new power structure in Damascus. This accommodation centers on Russia's core strategic interests: maintaining its naval facility in Tartus and its air base in Latakia, which provide Moscow with crucial Mediterranean access and power projection capabilities. As one analysis notes, "HTS is open to Russia retaining some bases, if it benefits Syria." This pragmatic arrangement suggests that Russia's primary concern was never exclusively about preserving the Syrian State but rather safeguarding its strategic assets in Syria.

The agreement with Russia reveals several key aspects of HTS's foreign policy approach:

• Recognition of Russian influence: Despite previous hostilities, HTS acknowledges Russia's continuing role in Syria

• Security guarantees: Providing assurances that Russian bases would not be threatened stabilizes the conflict

• Economic considerations: Potential future cooperation on reconstruction and energy exports

• International legitimacy: Russian acceptance reduces HTS's isolation on the world stage

  
  

This pragmatic arrangement stands in stark contrast to HTS's previous ideology, which once viewed Russia as a primary enemy due to its military support for Assad. The shift demonstrates Jolani's evolution from ideologue to practical politician willing to make compromises previously unthinkable for a former al-Qaeda affiliate.

2.2. Comparative Analysis: Why Russia But Not Iran?

Table: Comparing Russian and Iranian Interests in Syria

Interest Factor	Russia	Iran
Strategic Assets	Naval (Tartus) & Air (Latakia) Bases	Land Bridge to Hezbollah
Primary Concerns	Base Access, Regional Influence	Ideological Expansion, Israel Confrontation
Flexibility on Assad	High (Interests > Personality)	Low (Ideological Commitment)
Israeli Reaction	Tolerated (Non-Provocative)	Opposed (Security Threat)

The fundamentally different nature of Russian versus Iranian interests in Syria explains why Jolani could reach an accommodation with Moscow but not Tehran. Russia's objectives are primarily strategic and geopolitical, focused on maintaining military bases and influencing regional dynamics. These interests are not inherently incompatible with HTS's rule, provided the new government respects Moscow's core security requirements. Iran's objectives, however, are both strategic and ideological, centered on maintaining the "Axis of Resistance" against Israel through its support for Hezbollah and other allied groups.

This distinction explains why Jolani only made offers to Russia, not to Iran. Indeed, Iran's desired "land bridge" for transferring weapons to Hezbollah directly contradicts Israeli security interests and would likely provoke Israeli military action against the Syrian government. Given HTS's dependence on Turkish and indirect Israeli tolerance, accommodating Iranian interests would jeopardize the regime's survival. This strategic reality forces Jolani to choose between ideological fellow travelers (Iran) and practical enablers of his rule (Turkey and Israel).

3. The Iranian Dilemma: Ideology Versus Expediency

3.1. Assessing the "Deeper Wound"

Jolani's description of the Iranian wound as "a little deeper" than Russia's requires critical examination given the historical context of the Syrian conflict. This characterization seems particularly incongruous when considering the relative impact of Russian versus Iranian involvement in the war. Russian military intervention, beginning in 2015, involved devastating aerial bombardment of civilian areas, including reported use of "double tapping" (returning to strike first responders) and other tactics that caused massive casualties. In contrast, Iranian involvement primarily involved military advisors and ground forces rather than direct aerial bombardment.

Several factors might explain Jolani's characterization:

• Sectarian dimensions

• Regional competition: Perception of Iran as a competing Islamic revolutionary model

• Historical tensions: Persian-Arab ethnic tensions influencing perceptions

• Local experiences

  
  

The assertion that Iran caused a "deeper wound" appears particularly questionable when considering that Russia provided the military backbone for Assad's forces throughout the conflict, enabling the regime to survive until December 2024. This suggests that Jolani's statement serves a political purpose rather than reflecting historical accuracy—perhaps aimed at justifying his tilt toward Turkey and Israel while maintaining rhetorical flexibility toward Tehran.

3.2 The Hypocrisy of "Open Doors"

Jolani's comment that "the door isn't closed" with Iran represents either remarkable hypocrisy or calculated opportunism. Given HTS's dependence on Turkey—which hosts approximately 2.9 million Syrian refugees and maintains military presence in northern Syria—and its implicit understanding with Israel regarding southern Syria, any meaningful rapprochement with Iran seems implausible in the near term. Turkey, a Sunni-majority country with its own regional rivalry with Iran, would likely view such overtures with suspicion, potentially jeopardizing the support that has been essential to HTS's survival and ascent to power.

If Syria under HTS were to follow a similar path to Jordan and UAE, it would indeed represent a significant strategic setback for the Axis of Resistance, effectively neutralizing what was once a crucial front against Israeli interests. This would accomplish through political realignment what Israel might otherwise need to achieve through military means: removing Syria from the Iran-Hezbollah axis.

4. Regional Alignment: The Turkish-Israeli Understanding

4.1. The "Birth Certificate" of the HTS Regime

The HTS-led government in Damascus indeed owes its existence to a tacit understanding between Turkey and Israel, which despite their tensions found common cause in containing Iranian influence and preventing continued Assad rule. Turkey provided crucial support to Syrian rebel groups including HTS, while Israel's relentless campaign against Iranian forces and assets in Syria weakened Assad's military capabilities. This created conditions favorable for the rebel offensive that ultimately toppled the regime.

This dependence on Ankara and Tel Aviv creates fundamental constraints on HTS's foreign policy autonomy. Turkey expects influence over governance in northern Syria, particularly regarding Kurdish-majority areas, and likely seeks preferential economic treatment in reconstruction contracts. Israel demands continued restrictions on Iranian presence and weapons transfers to Hezbollah, plus protection for Druze and other minorities in southern Syria.

4.2. The Resistance Framework and Its Disruption

Prior to the fall of Assad, Syria served as a crucial link in the regional resistance network against Israeli hegemony, enabling Iranian support to reach Hezbollah in Lebanon. This strategic depth allowed Palestinian resistance groups, including Hamas in Gaza, to operate with greater impunity, as Israel faced multiple potential fronts in any broader conflict. The effectiveness of this deterrent was evident in Hezbollah's ability to pin down significant Israeli military resources along the Lebanon-Israel border, reducing pressure on Gaza and creating a more balanced regional power dynamic.

The HTS takeover has fundamentally disrupted this equilibrium, potentially freeing Israeli military resources for intensified operations in Gaza and reducing strategic depth for resistance groups. This outcome aligns perfectly with Israeli security objectives, which seek to contain and fragment regional adversaries rather than facing a unified resistance front. Jolani recognizes this dynamic but appears willing to accept it as the price of power, calculating that the benefits of controlling Damascus outweigh the constraints imposed by his external backers.

5. Jolani's Strategic Calculus: Opportunism Over Ideology

5.1. The Evolution of a Pragmatist

From his beginnings in al-Qaeda in Iraq to his break with Islamic State and eventual rejection of transnational jihadism, Jolani has demonstrated a willingness to abandon previous affiliations when they no longer serve his strategic objectives. This history of betrayal—from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to Ayman al-Zawahiri—suggests a leader guided primarily by self-interest and survival rather than ideological commitment. This pattern continues in his approach to Russia and Iran. His willingness to negotiate with Moscow—formerly a deadly enemy—demonstrates that Jolani prioritizes political consolidation over past grievances. 

5.2 Governance Challenges and Future Prospects

The HTS-led government faces formidable challenges in consolidating control over Syria, including economic reconstruction estimated to require $250-400 billion, managing relations with various ethnic and religious communities, and balancing between competing external patrons.

The country remains divided among multiple power centers:

• HTS-dominated government controlling most urban centers

• Kurdish-led SDF maintaining autonomy in northeast Syria

• Turkish-backed SNA controlling parts of the north

• Israeli-supported Druze communities in the south

• Residual pro-Assad forces still active in some areas

  
  

This fragmentation ensures that Syria will remain a contested arena for regional competition, with various external powers backing different factions. In this environment, Jolani's statements regarding Russia and Iran should be understood as part of a broader strategy to maintain maneuver room between these competing forces rather than reflecting fixed geopolitical alignments.

6. Conclusion: Implications for Regional Stability

The future stability of Syria and the broader region will depend largely on whether Jolani can transition from rebel leader to statesman capable of governing a fractured country while managing complex external relationships. His past record suggests a savvy political operator capable of pragmatic adaptation, but also raises questions about reliability and consistency. If he moves too close to Iran, he risks alienating Turkey and Israel; if he completely rejects Tehran, he forfeits potential leverage against Israel. Navigating this complex geopolitical landscape will require diplomatic skill far beyond what was needed to win the military campaign against Assad.

• This article is written by Abu Dhar al-Bosni (lokiloptr154668 on X) and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the website), nor does it necessarily represent an agreement with these perspectives.