Hamas and its ʿAqIdah: TakfIrI-Salafism, Salafi-Jihadism or Political Islamism?

The Ideological Composition of Hamas: Deciphering the Aqeeda of the Qassam Brigades

A critical, and often oversimplified, question in analyzing Hamas is the precise nature of its ideological foundation, particularly as it manifests within its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. This analysis argues that while individual members of Qassam may personally espouse Salafi-Jihadist (SJ) sympathies, the organization's leadership structure, theological grounding, and political strategy remain firmly within the historical Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwani) tradition, distinct from the Salafi-Takfirism of groups like later Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State.

The Foundational Framework: Hamas as an Ikhwani Project

To understand Hamas, one must first recognize its genesis as an offshoot of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. Its scholarly and political leadership inherently operates within an Ikhwani ideological framework. This framework is pragmatic and politically engaged, prioritizing community building (da'wa) and national liberation within a Palestinian context, albeit with the long-term goal of an Islamic state. The theological references for these leaders are typically the modern pillars of Islamist thought, such as Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, rather than a direct and exclusive recourse to classical Salafi authorities like Ibn Taymiyyah or Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab.

This distinction is crucial. While Qutb's ideas undoubtedly influenced later jihadist thought, his work exists within a distinct 20th-century Islamist context, separate from the strict, creed-focused (aqeeda) methodology of Salafism. The Ikhwani approach allows for a degree of flexibility in political and social matters that pure Salafism often rejects.

The Military Wing: Grassroots Sentiment vs. Command Structure

It is highly probable that many rank-and-file members, particularly those in their early twenties radicalized by conflict and immersed in global jihadist media ecosystems, fancy themselves as being the Vanguard of post-2000s Salafi Jihadism. They thus may adopt the aesthetic, rhetorical fervor, and rigid worldview associated with Salafi-Jihadism. This, however, is a phenomenon of grassroots adoption, not an indicator of official doctrinal alignment.

The critical factor is the command structure. For the Qassam Brigades to qualify as a Salafi-Jihadist entity as an organization, its leadership must itself adhere to and enforce that ideology. The available evidence strongly suggests this is not the case. The Qassam Brigades are not an independent entity; they are the armed wing of Hamas and are ultimately subservient to its political bureau and religious authorities. Their operations are directed toward the nationalistic goal of liberating Palestine, which aligns with Ikhwani "staged" strategy, rather than the immediate, borderless global jihad proclaimed by IS and AQ.

Historical Precedents and the "Borderline Salafi" Label

Groups like the Jordanian MB Fedayeen, Lebanon's Tawhid Movement, and Egypt's Gama'a Islamiya (in its earlier phases) all exemplify the model of an armed Ikhwani wing. They often employed militant Salafi-like rhetoric and enforced strict social codes in their territories, leading some to loosely label them "borderline Salafi."

However, this is a descriptive, not a doctrinal, categorization. Their ideology remained fundamentally rooted in the Islamist politics of the Brotherhood, not the pristine Salafi manhaj (methodology). The term "Sururi" – referring to followers of the Syrian thinker Muhammad Surur who blended Salafi theology with Ikhwani political activism – might be a more precise, though debated, classification for some of these groups. Yet, even this label requires that the leadership itself adopts that specific synthesis. There is no compelling evidence that the senior echelons of Qassam's command are Sururi or Salafi in their theology.

Conclusive Evidence: Practices Anathema to Salafism

The most definitive proof against a Salafi classification for Hamas's leadership lies in some of their documented practices, which are considered blatant religious innovations (bid'ah) and even acts of disbelief (kufr) by strict Salafis. 

For instance, figures like Yahya Sinwar have not only permitted but participated in public Mawlid celebrations (commemorating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad). Furthermore, the use of honorifics like "Karamallahu wajhah" (May Allah honor his face) for Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib is a practice common among Shia and some Sunni traditions but is vehemently rejected by Salafis, who view it as excessive praise. For a Salafi leadership, engaging in these acts would be theologically impossible. Their occurrence in Gaza under Hamas's rule is therefore a powerful indicator that the group's ideological core remains pragmatically Ikhwani, not rigidly Salafi.

Conclusion

In summary, the ideology of Hamas and its Qassam Brigades cannot be monolithic. While a bottom-up adoption of Salafi-Jihadist sympathies among some fighters is a credible and important sociological factor, it does not define the organization. The command structure, theological references, and political strategies are orchestrated by a leadership that remains within the broad Ikhwani tradition. This leadership tolerates certain practices that are theologically irreconcilable with Salafism, proving that the Qassam Brigades are best understood as the military wing of an Islamist-nationalist organization, not as a protégé of Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State. Their ideological lineage runs through Gaza, Cairo, and the legacy of Hassan al-Banna—not through Raqqa or the doctrines of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

• This article is written by Abu Dhar al-Bosni (lokiloptr154668 on X) and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the website), nor does it necessarily represent an agreement with these perspectives.