From Beirut to Karbala: Mao’s Water-Fish Doctrine of Resistance and Hezbollah’s Strategy

Introduction

The maritime attack attributed to Hezbollah did not provoke public outrage among Lebanese populations at the time; the commonly given explanation is that no Lebanese civilians were killed while at least 299 foreign occupying military personnel were killed. Even critics of Hezbollah within Lebanon said that “in the 1980s, Hezbollah was honorable.”

Local Support and the Manhaj of Hezbollah

A central operational principle of Imad Mughniyah and Hezbollah’s leadership (including Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah) is to attack foreign or occupying forces while exercising caution to avoid harming the local population: To kill the kuffar but be as careful as possible to not harm locals, so that the movement doesn't cause the hatred of the native population - as, like Mao and Guevara also said, the native population is the water where the fish - the guerrilla - lives his life, and if the guerrilla becomes hated by the native population, he will inevitably die like the fish out of the water.

Hezbollah's Manhaj and Its Influence On The Early Salafi Jihadists

In his fatwa for jihad against the US in Iraq, Osama bin Laden used the examples of Hezbollah's Beirut and Al-Khobar operations as "victories of Islam", urging Sunni fighters to emulate them:

"Likewise, let me remind you of the defeat of the American forces in Beirut in 1982, soon after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, when the Lebanese resistance was personified by the truck laden with explosives that struck the main military base of the US Marines in Beirut, killing 242 soldiers - towards Hell was their destination and what an evil destination that is. Then after the Second Gulf War, America deployed her forces to Somalia and killed over thirteen thousand sons of the Muslims therein, before the lions of Islam from amongst the 'Arab Afghans' and their brothers from that region pounced upon her and rubbed her arrogance into the dust, killing scores of them, destroying their tanks and downing their aircraft. Thus, America and her allies fled in the darkness of the night without disturbing the attention of anyone so Praise and Glory be to Allah for this. During that same period, the young Mujahideen prepared for them explosives in Aden and after their detonation, the cowardly Americans ran away and fled the country in less than 24 hours. Then in 1995, the explosion in Riyadh took place, killing four Americans, in a clear message from the people of that region displaying their rejection and opposition to the American policy of bankrolling the Jews and occupying the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries. The following year, another explosion in Al-Khobar killed 19 Americans and wounded more than 400 of them, prompting them to move their bases from the cities to the desert."

Indeed, speaking to Robert Fisk in 1996, he again praised the carefulness displayed by the assailants of the Khobar bombing - masterminded by Haj Mughniyah and the IRGC general Haj Ahmad Vahidi - not to kill any Saudi soldiers or civilians:

"...what happened in Riyadh and al-Khobar showed that the people who did this have a deep understanding in choosing their targets. They hit their main enemy, which is the Americans. They killed no secondary enemies, nor their brothers in the army or the police in Saudi Arabia."

Hezbollah's Manhaj and Its Influence On Iraqi Shia Islamists

This carefulness was displayed again in this masterful operation in Iraq, which Haj Qasim Sulaymani himself planned, and Hezbollah's Musa Daqduq and Hashd's Qais Khazali executed to perfection: when the base was infiltrated, the Iraqi soldiers and cops were not harmed, only the Americans. Haj Mughniyah himself in 1985 separated the American from the non-American passengers of TWA Flight 847, releasing the latter.

The teacher of them all, Imam Khumayni (ra) in 1979 released every Black person on day 1 of the US hostage crisis, saying that they, as mazlumin, are not to blame for the actions of Shaytan al-Akbar in Washington. Thus we always see a clear grasp of Schmitt's "friend-enemy distinction" by Shia and also Ikhwani (Hamas, PIJ) resistance groups, which earns them the communal approval that a guerrilla movement needs in order to stay alive as such within its community. This is in total contrast to the Neo-Takfiris such as Zarqawi or Baghdadi, who attack the friend more than the enemy, blowing up mosques or shopping malls full of Muslim families.

The Architect of Asymmetric War: A Eulogy for Haj Imad Mughniyeh

In the records of asymmetric conflict, few figures cast a longer or more formidable shadow than Haj Imad Fayez Mughniyeh. His was a presence that transcended borders, from the besieged streets of Beirut to the operational theaters of Thailand and Argentina, from the battlefields of the Gulf to the heart of the struggle in Palestine and Iraq. He was not merely a fighter; he was a grand strategist of confrontation, an architect of calculated chaos who systematically challenged the hegemony of the American empire in the region. As a master of cunning and a pioneer of unconventional warfare, he became the uncrowned sovereign of the shadow war, giving tangible, explosive form to a legacy of Arab defiance.

Mughniyeh’s operations were not isolated incidents but strategic statements that reverberated across the globe. He understood the power of spectacle in modern conflict. His name became a headline, a symbol of a resistance that could strike at the core of modern power. While ideological divisions persisted, even with those who opposed him, his operational legacy became an indelible part of the region's modern history. His planning and tactics served as a dark ink, scripting devastating chapters for American interests—from the simultaneous embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 to the lethal strike on the USS Cole near the shores of Aden in 2000.

His mastery lay in seizing dates and etching them into the collective memory of both ally and adversary. The modern Middle Eastern calendar is, in many ways, a testament to his campaign:

April 18, 1983: The detonation of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, a declaration of a new kind of war.

October 23, 1983: The barracks bombings, a catastrophic blow that redefined the limits of military occupation.

November 11, 1982: The day of Ahmad Qasir's pioneering martyrdom operation, setting a precedent.

May 25, 2000: The liberation of South Lebanon, a victory to which his years of pressure contributed decisively.

July 12-14, 2006: The raid and the neutralization of the Israeli navy's flagship, demonstrating strategic depth and capability during the July War.

When the architects of the "New Middle East"—the Global Arrogance and its Zionist allies—envisioned a region remade in their own colonial image, Haj Imad Mughniyeh authored a different reality. He forged a resistant Middle East that does not capitulate but retaliates, one that answers aggression not with a turned cheek, but with a calibrated and devastating response.

His legacy is not confined to history books; it is operational doctrine. His tactical fingerprints are visible on every blessed rocket that arcs from Gaza into the occupying entity, on every sophisticated tunnel and impenetrable fortification in South Lebanon. His innovations in roadside warfare—the cone-shaped charges and EFPs (Explosively Formed Projectiles)—continue to haunt American armor in Iraq, dismantling Bradleys, Abrams, Strykers, and Humvees. His ethos of leveraging technology and surprise empowers every drone that patrols the skies, deterring aggressors from striking Yemen.

Ultimately, Haj Imad Mughniyeh was a man governed by a profound and unshakable conviction: that true power in the 21st century does not reside solely with those who possess the most advanced weaponry, but with those who possess the most formidable will. He dedicated his life to proving that resolve, when fused with strategic genius, could become the most decisive weapon of all.

• This article is written by Abu Dhar al-Bosni (lokiloptr154668 on X) and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the website), nor does it necessarily represent an agreement with these perspectives.