Fitna vs. Intifada: How Anglo-Zionist Strategy Exploits Sectarian Divisions

The Anglo-Zionist strategy thrives on a simple linguistic dichotomy: their favorite Arabic word is fitna—strife between Muslims—and their most hated and feared is intifada—an uprising that unites Muslims against their common enemy. Whenever fitna erupts within the Muslim world, the imperialist powers are reassured. They understand that the Ummah possesses all the human and material resources necessary to become a strong, independent force. As CIA strategist George Friedman noted in 2010, a united Islamic world would pose a strategic threat to US global dominance greater than Russia and comparable only to China. Consequently, the West has committed to an unending campaign of sowing disunity to prevent this consolidation of power.

During the early to mid-2000s, following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and Israel's war on Lebanon, a significant shift occurred. Both Sunnis and Shias began to recognize that the West's true enemy was the Ummah itself, transcending sectarian lines. This period, roughly from 2003 to 2006, saw the parallel formulation of two anti-imperialist resistance doctrines—one by Sunni theoreticians, the other by Shia ones.

In 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri outlined a jihadist endgame focused on "creating territorially contiguous Islamic entities in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, and then liberating Palestine." Superficially, this vision resembled that of Haj Qasem Soleimani. The critical difference was foundational: Zawahiri envisioned a Sunni Caliphate, while Soleimani foresaw a pan-regional, cross-sectarian alliance of anti-colonial forces led by the revolutionary vanguard, Umm al-Qura (Iran).

These two visions eventually clashed, first in Iraq and then in Syria. Although both factions shared a primary hatred for America and Zionism, the aggressive sectarianism of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi became a fatal wedge. As I have argued in my articles on the "Great Game" and "Sectarianism vs Anti-Imperialism," a historic opportunity was lost. While America and its taghuti allies maintained a united front, the resistance forces fractured along sectarian lines. What could have been a unified Sunni-Shia front of mujahideen as early as 2004 was shattered—a division that even brought Hamas and Hezbollah to the brink of a split for two weeks in June 2013.

In my assessment, the responsibility for this sectarian schism lies primarily with Zarqawi, Abu Muhammad al-Jolani (who carried Zarqawi's divisive ideology into Syria), and the American strategy of leveraging certain Shia factions as mercenaries in Iraq. I do not place the blame on Iran. On the contrary, the case study of April 2004 is telling: Iraqi Sunnis and Shias, both reportedly equipped with Iranian weapons, coordinated a successful nationwide offensive against US forces. This event demonstrates the tremendous potential of a Shia-Sunni mujahid alliance.

It is no wonder, then, that America seeks to stifle this potential by any means necessary. Wikileaks revelations confirmed this, exposing a State Department memorandum that explicitly advocated for encouraging "anti-Persian" propaganda throughout the Sunni world. A figure like the despicable Jolani is the perfect manifestation of this strategy—aggressively sectarian against anti-colonial forces while being subservient to American interests. He is a Zarqawi to Iranians and a Mahmoud Abbas to the Zionists: the ultimate sower of fitna and destroyer of intifada, precisely the asset desired by strategists like David Petraeus.

• This article is written by Abu Dhar al-Bosni (lokiloptr154668 on X) and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the website), nor does it necessarily represent an agreement with these perspectives.