Drone Diplomacy: How Iran’s Intervention in Sudan Reshaped the Civil War Against UAE Proxies

Introduction: War Ignited

Since its eruption in April 2023, Sudan's civil war has rapidly devolved into one of the world's most severe humanitarian crises, claiming tens of thousands of lives and displacing over 12 million people. The conflict, a brutal struggle for power between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), under General Mohamed “Hemedti” Dagalo, quickly stalemated.

The RSF’s initial momentum, fueled by captured weaponry and superior mobility, was met by a SAF hamstrung by critical shortages of drones and precision munitions. Into this strategic vacuum stepped foreign patrons, internationalizing the conflict. While the United Arab Emirates (UAE) privately cultivated the RSF, Iran’s abrupt decision to revive ties with Khartoum and funnel arms to the SAF has proven to be a decisive intervention, materially altering the trajectory of the fighting.

Diplomatic Re-engagement and the Arms Pipeline

The foundation for Iran's military support was a swift diplomatic reconciliation. In late 2023, Sudan's junta moved to restore relations with Tehran, which had been severed in 2016 under international pressure on Omar al-Bashir. By early 2024, ties were officially reinstated, culminating in high-level talks where the two nations issued statements of mutual support, established joint committees, and waived diplomatic visas. Crucially, Iran explicitly pledged to support Sudan’s government “in their fight” against the “rebel” RSF.

This diplomatic facade enabled a concrete military partnership. In practice, Khartoum granted Iranian navy vessels limited access to Port Sudan, providing Tehran with a strategic toehold on the Red Sea. While both nations publicly denied any deal for a permanent base, this naval access served as immediate strategic compensation. Concurrently, Khartoum began placing weapons orders. A Sudanese delegation visited Iran in December 2023 to procure drones, a request that was swiftly met, with Iranian cargo planes soon appearing in Port Sudan, signaling the start of a new, lethal phase of the conflict.

The Game-Changer: Iranian UAVs on the Battlefield

Iran’s provision of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly the Mohajer-6, has been a pivotal factor in reversing the RSF's momentum. Open-source analysts tracked numerous cargo flights by sanctioned Iranian airlines into Port Sudan from late 2023 through mid-2024. Satellite imagery later confirmed the presence of Mohajer-6 drones and their ground-control vehicles at SAF airbases.

On the battlefield, these systems provided a capability the SAF desperately lacked: persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) combined with precision strike capacity. The Mohajer-6 and smaller Ababil-3 drones began systematically targeting RSF positions, forcing fighters to abandon entrenched areas and enabling SAF ground advances. By mid-2024, footage and RSF social media posts documented Iranian UAVs engaging targets in Omdurman and Khartoum North. Beyond drones, Iran supplied anti-tank missiles and other munitions, effectively replenishing and modernizing the SAF's arsenal to counter the RSF's initial advantages.

Reclaiming the Urban Battlegrounds

The tactical impact of Iranian weaponry was immediate and pronounced. In early 2024, after months on the defensive, the SAF began claiming significant advances in the capital region. The army broke the RSF siege of its command camp in Bahri (Khartoum North) and crossed the Nile into central Khartoum. General al-Burhan’s personal visit to troops at the recaptured Al-Jaili oil refinery symbolized a major psychological and strategic turnaround.

Analysts attribute these gains directly to the new capabilities afforded by Iranian drones. With enhanced artillery spotting and precision strikes, the SAF retook key neighborhoods in Omdurman and Khartoum North. The momentum continued into 2025, with the SAF capturing Wad Madani, a major city in central Sudan, in what army spokesmen called their largest gain in nearly two years. Hemedti himself publicly conceded this loss, blaming Iranian drones for turning the tide. This admission underscores how foreign arms have directly reshaped the conflict's frontline, swinging the balance of power, for the first time, in the SAF's favor.

The Geopolitical Stakes: Iran’s Red Sea Strategy

Iran’s intervention transcends tactical battlefield support; it is a calculated strategic gambit to secure long-term influence in the Red Sea corridor. Sudan’s 530-mile coastline represents a gateway to Africa and the critical Bab al-Mandab Strait. By arming the SAF, Tehran is investing in a future where a indebted Khartoum is compelled to accommodate Iranian strategic interests, notably a permanent naval presence.

Although both governments officially deny plans for a permanent base, the docking of Iranian warships at Port Sudan demonstrates a tangible, if incremental, progress toward this goal. Furthermore, Tehran is leveraging its support to pull Sudan deeper into its geopolitical orbit, coordinating positions at the United Nations and positioning Iranian firms for lucrative post-war reconstruction contracts. In essence, arms shipments are the currency with which Iran is purchasing a renewed alliance, aiming to secure a stable partner on the Red Sea and project power into a region traditionally dominated by its rivals.

The Countervailing Force: The UAE-RSF Axis

The conflict in Sudan is a mirror of broader regional rivalries, with the UAE’s entrenched support for the RSF forming the counterpoint to Iran’s backing of the SAF. For years, Abu Dhabi has cultivated the RSF as a bulwark against Islamist movements, funding its operations through complex gold-for-arms networks. Since the war began, flight-tracking data and on-the-ground evidence have revealed a steady flow of Emirati-chartered flights carrying advanced weaponry, such as Chinese-made Wing Loong II drones, to RSF units via eastern Chad and Darfur.

The UAE’s motivations are starkly pragmatic. The RSF controls Darfur’s lucrative gold mines and smuggling routes, assets that directly benefit Emirati commercial interests. Furthermore, with investments planned on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, Abu Dhabi views the RSF as a more reliable partner than the SAF, which it perceives as aligned with Islamist and Iranian-friendly currents. This dynamic has effectively transformed Sudan into a primary theater for the ongoing power struggle between Iran and the Gulf states.