Disproving the Claims that the Zionst Entity Created, Funded, or Supported Hamas: A Historiographic Analysis

Disproving the Claims that Israel Created, Funded, or Supported Hamas: A Historiographic Analysis

This article solely serves as a summary and analysis of the original work "Disproving the Claims that the Zionist Entity is Invincible" by Mujamma Haraket. The purpose of this piece is to provide a concise overview and facilitate understanding of the source material, which can be read in its entirety here: https://mujammaharaket.substack.com/p/disproving-the-claims-that-the-zionist  

In other words, the purpose of this piece is to create a comprehensive summary of the original writing; it is by no means a substitute for the full article.

Introduction

This article addresses a persistent historical claim: that the Zionist entity intentionally "created," "funded," or "supported" Hamas. This narrative, initially promoted by Yasser Arafat and Fatah in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was later adopted by liberal Zionist journalists and elements within the Israeli intelligence community. It has since gained traction among certain academics, journalists, and political figures, becoming a commonplace assertion in discourse on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Proponents of this thesis, such as academic Beverly Milton-Edwards, argue that Israel tolerated and even encouraged Islamic activism in Gaza as a counterweight to the secular nationalism of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This view has been echoed by respected figures like historian Rashid Khalidi and EU diplomat Josep Borrell. However, the narrative's academic foundation is weak. It was robustly challenged upon its emergence, most notably by Khaled Hroub, a leading scholar on Hamas, who systematically dismantled its premises in a 2000 book review and his subsequent work.

The evidence for the claim rests on two mischaracterized historical instances:

1. Israeli permits granted to social institutions linked to the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood (the precursor to Hamas) in the 1970s and 80s.

2. The 2018-2019 agreement, negotiated via Egypt, which allowed for the transfer of Qatari funds into Gaza to prevent a humanitarian collapse and maintain calm.

Section 1: The Grassroots History of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood and Its Social Institutions

To understand the origins of Hamas, one must first understand the indigenous history of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan). Founded in Gaza in 1945, the Palestinian Ikhwan grew rapidly, boasting 25 branches and up to 20,000 members by 1947. Its popularity stemmed from its role in resisting British rule and opposing Zionist settlement.

After the 1948 war (the Nakba), the movement's branches were severed. The Gaza branch, under Egyptian control, maintained a more revolutionary character, while the West Bank branch, annexed by Jordan, focused on political and educational activities. In the 1950s, key figures like Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar) and Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) had affiliations with the Ikhwan before eventually breaking away to form the secular nationalist movement Fatah, arguing that armed struggle, not social proselytization, was the path to liberation.

Following Gamal Abdel Nasser's crackdown on the Brotherhood in Egypt in 1954, the Gazan Ikhwan was forced underground. It abandoned armed resistance and pivoted entirely to grassroots social and religious work—a strategic decision that led to its marginalization during the heyday of Arab nationalism but laid the groundwork for its future resurgence.

After Israel's occupation of Gaza and the West Bank in 1967, however, the Ikhwan entered its "mosque-building phase." Its strategy was to build a pious society through education and social services, believing this would prepare a new generation for eventual confrontation with Zionism. This work was funded endogenously through Islamic alms (zakat), not foreign or Israeli support.

Key institutions included:

• Al-Jam'iyah al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Society): Established in 1967, it focused on youth programs, sports, and religious lectures. Israel granted it a license, perceiving it as a non-threatening social organization.

• Al-Mujamma’ al-Islami (The Islamic Center): Founded in 1973 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and others, it provided a wider range of social services, clinics, and schools. Its license was initially granted, briefly revoked due to a local dispute, and then reissued. Its funding came from donations within the West Bank Palestinian community.

• The Islamic University of Gaza: Founded in 1978, its board was dominated by Ikhwan figures.

These institutions were tremendously successful, doubling the number of mosques in Gaza from 200 to 600 between 1967 and 1987. They garnered deep popular support by filling the vacuum left by the occupying authority and the distant PLO. Israeli policy at the time was to tolerate non-military social and political activities from all factions, nationalist and Islamist alike. This tolerance is often misrepresented as active sponsorship.

Section 2: Permits, Licenses, and the Misguided "Creation" Thesis

The claim that Israel "created" Hamas relies on the fact that the Ikhwan's social institutions operated with Israeli permits. This argument is flawed for several reasons:

1. Comparative Licensing: Israel granted licenses to a vast array of Palestinian institutions, including those openly affiliated with the PLO and leftist factions (e.g., Birzeit University, numerous newspapers, and charities). Licensing the Mujamma was consistent with this general policy of tolerating civil society, not a unique act of creation.

2. Repression, Not Support: When the Ikhwan did engage in military activity, Israel responded harshly. In the early 1980s, Sheikh Yassin secretly established a military wing. When this network was uncovered in 1984 through an arms-buying sting operation, Yassin was arrested and sentenced to 13 years in prison. This is not the treatment of a protected asset.

3. Indigenous Motivation: The shift towards armed resistance was an internal, organic process. It was driven by the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987 and influenced by the writings of Islamic thinkers like Munir Shafiq, not by Israeli design. Hamas was founded on December 8, 1987, as an outgrowth of the Ikhwan's secret military committee and in response to popular uprising.

Section 3: The Political Origins of the Narrative: Arafat, Fatah, and Academic Echoes

The narrative that Israel created Hamas was born not from historical fact but from political expediency. As Hamas grew in popularity during the First Intifada and positioned itself as a rival to Fatah, Yasser Arafat began accusing the group of being an Israeli invention to undermine the PLO. These accusations intensified whenever tensions between Fatah and Hamas rose, particularly as Hamas led the opposition to the Madrid-Oslo peace process that Arafat championed.

In 1991, Hamas joined leftist and other rejectionist factions to form the "Alliance of Ten Factions" in opposition to Oslo. This challenge to Fatah's hegemony prompted Arafat and his lieutenant Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) to intensify their claims that Hamas was an Israeli proxy. This was a deliberate strategy to delegitimize a domestic rival.

This politically motivated narrative was then inadvertently amplified by academics like Beverly Milton-Edwards. In her review of Milton-Edwards's work, Hroub critiqued her for relying exclusively on sources hostile to Hamas and for presenting the licensing of Islamic institutions as proof of "collusion" while ignoring that nationalist institutions received the same permits. Despite these flaws, this interpretation became a "received view" in some academic circles.

Hroub offers five compelling reasons why the "Israel-created-Hamas" thesis is incorrect:

1. Israel's licensing policy was applied equally to nationalist and Islamist institutions.

2. Israel feared that crushing a religious movement would recast the conflict in religious terms, sparking broader regional backlash.

3. The narrative flatters the Israeli "superiority complex," suggesting that even its enemies are its own creations, thus maintaining an illusion of total control.

4. The rise of Political Islam was a region-wide phenomenon in the 1970s-90s (e.g., Iran, Egypt, Algeria), not an isolated event engineered by Israel.

5. While Israel may have tried to exploit divisions between Hamas and Fatah (a common tactic in conflicts), this is a far cry from creating or controlling Hamas.

Section 4: The Qatari Cash Payments: Negotiation, Not Support

A more recent variation of the narrative focuses on the Qatari funds allowed into Gaza between 2018 and 2023. This argument misrepresents a hard-won ceasefire agreement as evidence of Israeli support.

This policy emerged from the context of the "Great March of Return" protests (2018-2019). To de-escalate sustained border protests and avoid a full-scale war, Egypt, the UN, and Qatar brokered a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. The terms were straightforward: in exchange for Hamas maintaining calm and preventing rocket fire, Israel would ease the blockade, including allowing Qatar to deliver millions in cash to pay civil servants and fund humanitarian aid.

This was not a gift. It was a transactional agreement. The funds were a necessary pressure valve to prevent Gaza's total economic collapse, which Israel feared would lead to war. When Israel delayed or added new conditions, Hamas often responded with escalation, such as rocket fire or incendiary balloons, to force compliance.

The transfers were transparent and designed for public welfare. The money was used to pay salaries of doctors, teachers, and civil servants and to address crippling unemployment. It was meticulously separated from the military funding of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, which had its own independent sources.

Politicians like Yair Lapid who later accused Netanyahu of "funding Hamas" were leveraging this complex reality for domestic political gain, simplifying a difficult policy of containment into a soundbite of betrayal. The choice for Israeli policymakers was not between "funding Hamas" and "defeating Hamas," but between allowing humanitarian aid to prevent a crisis or facing perpetual escalation. Framing this negotiated arrangement as proof that Hamas is an Israeli "controlled opposition" is a profound misreading of the adversarial and transactional nature of the relationship.

In Summary

The claim that Israel created, funded, or supported Hamas is a politicized narrative that collapses under historical scrutiny. It conflates Israel's short-term policy of tolerating social and religious activism with long-term strategic support. It mistakes the tactical management of a hostile entity—through ceasefires and humanitarian allowances—for sponsorship. And it overlooks the deeply indigenous roots of Islamic resistance in Palestine, which grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood's social work and was fueled by popular discontent with both the occupation and the secular nationalist movement.

The narrative's persistence is due to its utility to various actors: for Fatah, it was a tool to discredit a rival; for liberal Israeli journalists, it was a cudgel to attack right-wing governments; for Hamas's detractors, it is a way to deny the movement's authentic grassroots support. Academic work must move beyond this debunked thesis to engage with the more complex and challenging reality of Hamas as a homegrown phenomenon that Israel has struggled to manage, contain, and understand—but did not create.

• This article is written by a friend of mine “Mujamma Haraket” and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the Website), nor does it represent an agreement with these perspectives.