Abu Mohammad al-Jolani: A Radical Break from, or the Logical Continuation of, Syrian and Iraqi Salafi Jihadism?

Introduction: The Error of Isolated Analysis

A critical error frequently made by analysts of the Syrian conflict is to treat the insurgency as an isolated phenomenon, born solely from native Syrian discontent and developing in a vacuum. This perspective overlooks the essential historical and ideological lineage that shaped it. To frame this analysis, it is useful to recall the observation of a Turkish historian who once argued that “Atatürk was not a radical break from the Ottoman past, but rather an expected development from it.” Likewise, one must not interpret Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, and his current pro-Western realpolitik stance as merely a personal or tactical decision. Rather, it represents the culmination of an ideological evolution within the Salafi-jihadist insurgency, a trajectory that began in Iraq and matured in Syria.

To state it plainly: Jolani is not Zarqawi, but he is the ultimate product of the worldview that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi championed—a worldview of Islamic realpolitik, where Islam is instrumentalized for political power, rather than inspiring a genuine political Islam guided by theological principles. In essence, historical events, political decisions, and ideologies do not emerge from nothing; they are the products of a continuous chain of past events, each piece building upon the last.

The Iraqi Crucible: The Foundational Insurgency

To truly understand the ideology, rise, and development of the Syrian insurgency, one must first study its predecessor in Iraq. This is necessary not only because Jolani’s own worldview was forged in that crucible, but also because the Syrian uprising was, in many ways, a direct extension of the Iraqi insurgency. They shared the same existential fears, similar strategic worldviews, and, most importantly, an identical operational mentality. This shared ethos is perfectly captured in a letter from Zarqawi, where he sought to justify his savage attacks on Shia Muslims and his relative indifference toward fighting American forces. He wrote (summarised), “There is a consensus on the enmity of Americans, but the lurking threat of the Shia is not well known. They are trying to establish a Shia network from Iran, through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, to dominate the Ahl al-Sunnah… this is the bigger threat than the American occupation.”

The Strategy of Islamic Realpolitik

This was not merely sectarian hatred, but a cold, calculated strategy. As scholar Loretta Napoeloni observed as early as 2004-2005, Zarqawi, aware he could not directly defeat American military might, made a brutally realpolitik calculation. By attacking the Shia—a perceived softer target—he could provoke a severe sectarian backlash. This retaliation would, in turn, radicalize the Sunni populace, mobilizing them against the Shia across the region and thereby creating a sustainable power base for himself in Iraq. This analysis, evident in contemporaneous journalism and well-established among scholars of Salafi jihadism like Professor Shiraz Maher, reveals the core of what can be termed Islamic realpolitik (Islam-For-Politics, as termed in my book). This approach is devoid of rigid ideological purity concerning the "duty to resist"; instead, it treats Islam as a malleable force to be wielded for political gain by any means necessary. This inevitably involves the strategic reinterpretation of Islamic history and doctrine, remolding theology into a tool for specific political objectives.

Doctrinal Shift: The "Near Enemy" vs. The "Far Enemy"

This logic is inextricably linked to the doctrinal evolution of the "near enemy" versus the "far enemy." While earlier jihadist thought during 1980s-1990s, notably from Al-Qaeda central, prioritized attacking the "far enemy" (the U.S. and Israel) to force their withdrawal from the Muslim world, Zarqawi’s innovation was to aggressively prioritize the "near enemy." Initially defined as apostate regimes, this category was swiftly narrowed to focus almost exclusively on the Shia. This shift was so profound that it sometimes entailed a strategic indifference to, and even tacit collaboration with, the original "far enemy" if it served the immediate sectarian goal.

The Transmission of a Doctrine: From Iraq to Syria

Understanding this ideological shift clarifies the Sunni Iraqi insurgency’s transition from an anti-American struggle to a brutal sectarian civil war. It was within this specific context that Jolani himself emerged. According to analysts like Charles Lister, Jolani was appointed to a high-ranking position within the Iraqi insurgency's command in Mosul and "almost certainly" met Islamic State founder Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as early as 2008. This same Iraqi network subsequently expanded into Syria—ironically facilitated initially by the Assad regime’s own miscalculations—and established the first cells of what would become Jabhat al-Nusra in key cities like Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs. Critically, the operatives sent into Syria, including Jolani and his inner circle, were mostly old comrades of Zarqawi, and in some cases, even his relatives, ensuring the direct transmission of his strategic doctrine.

Activating the Blueprint: Sectarianization of the Syrian Uprising

Within this established context, the rapid sectarianization of the Syrian uprising becomes explicable. As early as the second week of the 2011 protests, videos emerged showing segments of the demonstrators exclusively attacking the symbols of Hezbollah and Iran—a focus that could not be explained by Tehran's or Hezbollah's actions at such an embryonic stage of the revolt. This was not a spontaneous outburst, but the activation of a pre-existing sectarian framework. Upon this signal, the dormant cells across Syria were reactivated, systematically steering the popular uprising toward the sectarian civil war that the Iraqi veterans had already blueprint.

Jolani as Evolution: The Logic of Pragmatism

Building upon this foundation, Jolani’s subsequent actions appear not as breaks from tradition, but as its logical evolution: The Realpolitik Islam, Islam-for-Politics. This context explains, with certain exceptions, why most Syrian insurgents were in favor of Western intervention and arms supplies; why Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Al-Qaeda central, felt compelled to instruct Jolani in 2011 not to use Syria as a base for attacking Western interests; and why Jolani could so easily orchestrate a formal split from Al-Qaeda in 2017 to normalize ties with regional and Western powers. For this new generation of neo-Takfiris, Islam is not a set of immutable principles guiding political action, but a tool to be utilized and adapted according to political realities.

Conclusion: The Enduring Sunnah of Zarqawi

Even today, Jolani’s political maneuvers—expressing softness toward Israel, attempting to broker the establishment of an American base in Damascus, seeking restored ties with Russia, and publicly declaring to the Israelis that "we have common enemies"—are not a betrayal of his origins. They are the Sunnah, or tradition, that Zarqawi founded and that was adopted by the generation of "Islamists" after him. The true Sunnah of Zarqawi is not merely sectarianism, though that is a component; it is a realpolitik mode of thinking that prioritizes the maximization of efficiency and power, even at the expense of Islamic doctrinal consistency. It is not inaccurate to suggest that this pragmatic, power-centric approach was itself influenced by the secular realpolitik of Saddam Hussein's regime, and was then inherited and Islamized by the "Islamist" insurgents who followed, given the massive influx of former Ba'athist military and intelligence personnel into the leadership of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq.

• All these arguments are explored in depth, across tens of pages with detailed citations, in the seventh chapter of my book. This very short explanation, however, serves to provide a broad understanding of how Jolani and his cohort think, representing them not as a deviation from Salafi jihadism, but as its most pragmatic and evolutionarily adapted product.