Iranian Strategic Calculus: Contrasting Reactions to the 1998 U.S. Embassy Bombings and 9/11

Introduction

Official Iranian reactions to attacks against the United States reveal significant strategic distinctions, particularly when comparing responses to the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings and the 2001 September 11th attacks. Analysis of contemporary statements and subsequent strategic context illuminates these differences.

The 1998 Embassy Bombings: Official Iranian Reaction

The Iranian reaction to the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, was notably distinct from later condemnations of 9/11. This perspective was articulated through key channels:

Kayhan Editorial (August 13, 1998): Reflecting views associated with Supreme Leader Khamenei's office, the newspaper Kayhan stated:

"The bombings of the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania are an important development. The key point is that they demonstrated the existence of an intense hatred of America in the hearts of the nations of the world. This hatred is so deep that despite taking the lives of many innocent people, the bombings prompted no negative reaction whatsoever, only because they struck a blow against American prestige. It seems that there is again need for reflection on the destructive international role of the United States; everyone should search for ways to institutionalize opposition to America, for whom titles such as 'the century's mother of corruption,' and 'the great Satan' are still fitting. The goal of those who control the world's vast information networks is to cover the repulsive faces of world-devourers and their crimes. When expression of the bitter truth is prevented by force, it is only natural that it express itself in the form of such violent incidents as those in Dar as-Salaam and Nairobi."

(Sources: Iran-e-azad and Agence France Presse)

This commentary framed the attacks as a manifestation of global anti-American sentiment, implicitly justifying the violence as a consequence of U.S. policy and a blow to American standing, while criticizing media coverage perceived as protecting U.S. interests.

Rafsanjani's Remarks (August 17, 1998): Former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani offered a different, yet similarly critical, perspective, focusing on causation:

"All the accusations made against Iran are lies... I call on the White House to listen to me and to try to discover the true roots of terrorism. Instead of offering a reward of two million dollars to find the attackers you should set a reward, of two million dollars or perhaps a Nobel prize, for whoever writes the best article on the causes of terrorist acts against the United States. The US must try to discover why, each time somebody wants justice, they attack the Americans. I say this to the White House: look for the causes in your arrogant attitude and your political double-speak about terrorism."

(Sources: Iran-e-azad and Agence France Presse)

Rafsanjani denied Iranian involvement and explicitly redirected focus onto U.S. foreign policy ("arrogant attitude," "political double-speak") as the root cause of anti-American attacks, suggesting introspection rather than retaliation.

Contrasting the Reaction to 9/11

It can be observed that this reaction is very different from the official Iranian (media, government, leadership) reaction to 9/11 which Iran unequivocally condemned. This stark contrast stems from fundamental strategic differences in the nature and consequences of the attacks, aligned with the Iranian-Hezbollah strategic vision of resistance.

Strategic Alignment (1998 & USS Cole 2000): The 1998 embassy bombings - as well as the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 - were of a nature closer to the Iranian-Hezbollah strategic vision of resistance. This vision involved attacking a soft tactical US target within the Muslim world, aiming to inflict costs and force America to withdraw from the region – a strategy exemplified by Hezbollah's 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut.

Strategic Disalignment (9/11): In contrast, 9/11 was an attack on hard targets inside America itself. From the perspective of Iranian strategic calculus, this action did not achieve the goal of expelling the U.S.; instead, it forced America to intervene deeper into the Muslim world rather than leave it. The scale and location of the attack triggered a massive, sustained U.S. military response.

Strategic Rationale for Condemning 9/11

Therefore, the unequivocal Iranian condemnation of 9/11 was not merely a show of good will to America (on Khatami's part it may have been that), but reflected sincere disapproval of 9/11 also from an Islamic revolutionary grand-strategic perspective. Genuine Islamic revolutionaries who otherwise approved of mass-casualty anti-US operations, from Khamenei and Nasrallah to Mullah Omar and even Sayf al-Adel, opposed 9/11 on a pragmatic-strategic basis because 9/11 only brought bigger pain to Muslims.

The immediate consequence for Iran was severe strategic vulnerability: of course every power in the region tried to get involved in the redrawing of the map post-9/11, and for Iran in particular it can today be claimed that Bush's wars eventually led to a much-larger Iranian influence in the ME, but back then this was not visible at all, and Iran found itself encircled by half-a-million NATO soldiers in its western and eastern borders as a result of America's post-9/11 wars. The perceived outcome was overwhelming U.S. military encirclement and immense suffering for Muslim populations, directly counter to the resistance strategy's objective of reducing U.S. regional presence.

Post-Hoc Justification and Assessment

Later of course Osama bin Laden (OBL) sugarcoated his decision by saying he did 9/11 precisely for the purpose of bringing America full-force into the region and causing it to overextend and self-destruct (based on what happened to the USSR in Afghanistan). However, this justification is viewed skeptically within the context of immediate consequences: I doubt he ever really thought in terms of 50-100 years, he just said this to avoid admitting that 9/11 led to a much worse position for the world's Muslims and not a better one, at least in the near and medium term.

Conclusion

Iran's contrasting reactions to the 1998 embassy bombings and the 2001 September 11th attacks underscore the primacy of strategic calculation over blanket ideological support for anti-American violence. The 1998 attacks, perceived as targeting U.S. prestige and presence abroad within the established framework of "resistance," elicited commentary focusing on U.S. culpability and the attacks' symbolic value. Conversely, 9/11, seen as a strategically catastrophic action inviting overwhelming U.S. retaliation and regional entrenchment that directly threatened Iran, resulted in unequivocal condemnation driven by pragmatic revolutionary interests, despite the prevailing anti-American ideology. The reaction was rooted in an assessment of consequences for both Iranian security and the perceived well-being of Muslims globally.