Strategic Patience: The Muqawama's Calculus of "Cold Wars" and "Hot Wars"

This analysis is written amid unconfirmed reports regarding the status of mujahid commander Sayyid Haytham Tabatabai "Abu Ali" of Hezbollah's military wing. The central arguments presented herein remain valid irrespective of the commander's ultimate fate—survival or martyrdom.

The Doctrine of "War Between Wars"

In the late 2000s, Major General Qasem Soleimani of the IRGC-Quds Force articulated a seminal strategic concept. He described the prevailing condition in the Middle East not as "peace between wars," but as "war between wars." This framework posits that the Resistance Axis (Muqawama) remains in a state of perpetual conflict with the Israeli occupation entity, even during periods of nominal ceasefire. During these phases, the war is not fought through direct kinetic attacks but through sustained, foundational efforts: stockpiling advanced weaponry, gathering intelligence, constructing defensive tunnels, fortifying liberated territories, and recruiting and training the next generation of mujahideen.

The critical element of this doctrine is the agency it grants the Resistance. The objective is to ensure that when the next phase of "hot war" erupts, it is the Muqawama that initiates it on its own terms, thereby seizing the strategic initiative and surprising the enemy. This was demonstrated decisively in the 2006 Lebanon War, initiated by a Hezbollah operation inside occupied Palestine, and again in the 2023 Al-Aqsa Flood Operation by Hamas. In both instances, the Resistance chose the time, place, and method of escalation, throwing the enemy into disarray and dictating the initial conditions of the conflict.

Conversely, this doctrine implies that when a strategic assessment deems the timing unfavorable for a hot war—such as during critical rebuilding phases or internal consolidation—the Resistance will exercise strategic patience. It denies the enemy the opportunity to force a confrontation under conditions that would be objectively disadvantageous to the Muqawama.

Historical Case Studies in Strategic Restraint

The history of the Resistance is replete with examples of this disciplined, long-term thinking, where immediate calls for revenge were sublimated to overarching strategic goals.

1.  Hamas and the 2004 Martyrdoms: Following the martyrdom of Sheikhs Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi in 2004, Hamas notably did not launch a full-scale war in retaliation. This was a calculated decision. The movement was executing a larger strategy: first, to allow the unilateral Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005, creating a territorial foothold, and second, to wrest control of Gaza from the U.S.-backed Fatah leadership of Mahmoud Abbas and Mohammed Dahlan, which it successfully achieved in 2007. A large-scale war in 2004 would have jeopardized this meticulous political and military plan.

2.  Hezbollah and the Martyrdom of Haj Imad Mughniyeh: When Hezbollah's legendary military commander, Haj Imad Mughniyeh, was martyred in February 2008, the organization did not respond with an all-out war. It was then deeply engaged in rebuilding its capabilities and infrastructure after the intense 2006 war. Launching a second major conflict so soon would have strategically disrupted this essential recovery period, sacrificing long-term preparedness for short-term vengeance.

3.  The Syrian Battlefield Calculus: Throughout the conflict in Syria, Hezbollah endured the martyrdom of several key commanders—including Mustafa Badreddine, Samir Kuntar, Jihad Mughniyeh, and Hassan Shateri—many through direct Israeli airstrikes or via intelligence shared with Takfiri forces. With the exception of a limited rocket response after Jihad Mughniyeh's death in January 2015, Hezbollah largely abstained from opening a full-scale southern front. The strategic assessment was clear: the primary objective was the defeat of the Takfiri threat in Syria. A war with Israel would have fractured the Muqawama's forces, diverted critical resources, and ultimately served the interests of their common enemies.

These cases illustrate that the Resistance operates according to multi-year strategic plans, akin to a "well-oiled machine." It does not function on the basis of personal feuds or short-term emotional reactions, but on a long-term rhythm of "cold wars between hot wars"—a process of gradually building pressure and capability before executing decisive, surprise attacks, all governed by the supreme principle of survival and proliferation.

The Geopolitical Reality of 2025: A Besieged Muqawama

As of November 2025, the geopolitical situation in Lebanon is one of acute encirclement. Hezbollah faces the Zionist enemy directly to the south, a hostile, Turkish-backed faction (Joulani's Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham) acting as a proxy adversary to the north in Syria, and a politically opposed, Maronite-led government within Lebanon itself that is perceived as aligned with Western and Zionist interests.

In this complex and constrained environment, Hezbollah's strategic assessment logically identifies the current phase as one for rebuilding and consolidation. The martyrdom of a senior commander like Haytham Tabatabai, while a significant tactical loss, does not alter this fundamental calculus. Objectively, initiating a major war now—whether for broader regional escalation or solely for revenge—would be strategically disadvantageous. The primary beneficiaries would be the Takfiri forces in Syria and the political opponents within Lebanon. A disciplined Muqawama will not risk a war for which it is not fully prepared. Continued rebuilding is the priority. The ultimate, and more meaningful, revenge for a martyr like Tabatabai would be a future, decisive victory by a fully reconstituted Resistance that liberates the Shebaa Farms, rather than a rash escalation involving "5-10 missiles" that triggers a premature and costly conflict.

The Constraint of Sunni Opposition and the Line Between Patience and Capitulation

A critical, often unstated, factor in this calculus is the stance of major Sunni powers. As Mohammed Deif implied in his October 7 address, if the Sunni masses and nations were united with the Muqawama, the combined force would be overwhelming. However, the current reality is the opposite. Sunni state involvement has frequently manifested as: 1) intercepting Iranian missiles aimed at the Israeli entity, and 2) enabling Takfiri groups to sever the geographical link between Resistance fronts in Syria.

This reality—where major Sunni regional powers are often de facto enemies of both Sunni and Shia Muqawama organizations—forces groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and Ansarallah to adopt strategic patience. They must account for this hostile flank when calculating their campaigns against the primary Zionist enemy.

However, it is vital to distinguish this strategic patience from capitulationism. The lackeys of a Jolani or a Mahmoud Abbas argue, "We are weak, therefore we cannot fight." The truth is that their leadership never intended to fight; even if possessed with strength, they would likely become "strong normalizers," akin to the regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in Egypt.

In contrast, for Hamas, Hezbollah, and Ansarallah, strategic patience is an active, purposeful state. It means, "We are rebuilding in order to fight another day." For these organizations, the fight against Zionism remains the unwavering strategic goal. There is no indication as of 2025 that they have abandoned the path of resistance ideology. A strategic defeat for the Muqawama occurs only when its leaders abandon the resistant ideological path for materialism and compromise, as seen in Ramallah. Martyrdom on the path to Al-Aqsa, whether in Gaza, Lebanon, or Yemen, is not a defeat; it is a testament to the enduring and blessed nature of the struggle.

• This article is written by Abu Dhar al-Bosni (lokiloptr154668 on X) and does not necessarily reflect the views of A.E.P. (the owner of the website), nor does it necessarily represent an agreement with these perspectives.